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INTRODUCTION
Bull Dogs. Tom promised his son that he would buy him a
bulldog for his sixteenth birthday. Therefore, Tom went to Hal's
Breeding Company to inquire about purchasing a bulldog. Hal
informed Tom that his prized dog, Coco, was expecting a litter of
puppies. Tom and Hal signed a contract. In the contract, Hal
promised to give Tom his pick of Coco's litter. In exchange, Tom
promised to pay Hal $1,000. A few weeks later, Coco gave birth
to five puppies. Instead of contacting Tom, Hal sold four of the
puppies to other people and decided to keep the final puppy for
future breeding purposes. When Tom found out about Hal's
action, he filed a cause of action for breach of contract.
Babies. After being diagnosed with endometriosis, Tammie
was unable to conceive a child. Thus, she and her husband, Ben,
decided to hire a surrogate to help them become parents.
Tammie and Ben purchased eggs from an anonymous donor and
had them fertilized with Ben's sperm. Then, Tammie and Ben
signed a contract with Harriet. In exchange for $10,000 and the
payment of her medical expenses, Harriet agreed to gestate the
couple's embryos. Harriet also promised to surrender the baby to
the couple and to have her parental rights terminated. Once
Harriet gave birth to a baby girl, she decided that she wanted to
keep the baby. As a result, Tammie and Ben filed a cause of
action for breach of contract.
The facts of both cases are similar. In both instances, one
person broke a promise. The main difference is the subject
matter of the contract. That difference may be enough to impact
the outcome of the cases. On the one hand, Tom has a good
chance of winning his case. The court is either going to award
him monetary damages or order Hal to give Tom the remaining
bulldog. To the contrary, the remedies available to Tammie and
Ben are uncertain. Given the effort they put into making sure
that the child was conceived, it is easy to see why the couple
would want the court to specifically enforce the contract and
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adjudicate them as the baby's legal parents. Although Harriet
did not contribute the genetic material used to create the child,
as the surrogate, she has established a bond with the child.
Consequently, she would probably be willing to return the
$10,000 and to reimburse the couple the money they paid for her
pregnancy-related expenses in order to be recognized as the
child's legal mother.
When faced with this type of breach of contract case, courts
are faced with a dilemma: Should babies be treated in the same
manner as bulldogs? Should the focus of the litigation be on the
existence of a contract or on the nature of the item for which the
parties contracted? Both legislatures and courts have attempted
to offer a solution to this complex problem. Neither branch has
relied exclusively on contract law to solve the cases. Since a baby
is a living, breathing human, legislatures and courts have been
reluctant to treat a surrogacy contract as just another form of a
service contract. This exists even in jurisdictions that recognize
the validity of surrogacy contracts.
Millions of young adults take measures to prevent
unplanned pregnancies.' The most common forms of
contraceptives used are birth control pills, devices, and condoms.2
If the woman is raped or unprepared for sexual intercourse, the
"morning after pill" gives her an opportunity to try to prevent
pregnancy.3 In the event that the woman has an unwanted
pregnancy, the law gives her the right to have an abortion' or to
put the child up for adoption.' The law has taken all of these
steps to protect women from unplanned or unwanted
pregnancies. At the other extreme, there are women who
I Michael A. Mogill, Misconceptions of the Law: Providing Full Recovery for the
Birth of the Unplanned Child, 1996 UTAH L. REV. 827, 840-41 (1996).
2 Anna Birenbaum, Shielding the Masses: How Litigation Changed the Face of
Birth Control, 10 S. CAL. REV. L. & WOMEN'S STUD. 411, 416-18 (2001).
Charu A. Chandrasekhar, RX for Drugstore Discrimination: Challenging
Pharmacy Refusals To Dispense Prescription Contraceptives Under State Public
Accommodations Laws, 70 ALB. L. REV. 55, 61-62 & n.23 (2006).
' See June Carbone, Cultural Conflict and the Revival of Class Warfare, 16
WASH. & LEE J. CIVIL RTS. & Soc. JUST. 369, 395-96 (2010) (discussing abortion as a
response to unplanned pregnancy).
I Jack Darcher, Market Forces in Domestic Adoptions: Advocating a
Quantitative Limit on Private Agency Adoption Fees, 8 SEATTLE J. FOR SOC. JUST.
729, 734-39 (2010) (discussing the different types of adoptions).
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desperately want to become mothers.' Historically, the only legal
option available to those infertile women was adoption.'
Currently, as a result of advances in reproductive technology,
infertile women can play a more active role in their quests to
become mothers. Unlike adoption, those women have the
opportunity to control the manner in which their children are
conceived and born. Surrogacy is one of the avenues infertile
women can take to arrive at motherhood.
The reasons why people enter into surrogacy arrangements
are as varied as the persons involved in the process.8 The
surrogacy process enables a woman who is unable to conceive or
carry a child to have a chance at motherhood. In a surrogacy
arrangement, one woman promises to help another woman to
become a mother.' The level of assistance the surrogate gives
varies. For instance, the surrogate's role may be limited to that
of a gestator or carrier. Gestational surrogacy, the most widely
used type of surrogacy, 0 involves the implantation of embryos
into the uterus of the woman acting as the surrogate." If the
contracting woman is capable of producing eggs but is unable to
carry a child, her eggs are fertilized with her husband's sperm to
create the embryos that are placed in the woman serving as a
6 Melissa Reynolds, How Old Is Too Old?: The Need for Federal Regulation
Imposing a Maximum Age Limit on Women Seeking Infertility Treatments, 7 IND.
HEALTH L. REV. 277, 302-03 (2010).
1 Nicole Rank, Note, Barriers for Access to Assisted Reproductive Technologies
by Lesbian Women: The Search for Parity Within the Healthcare System, 10 HOUS. J.
HEALTH L. & POL'Y 115, 116 (2010).
8 Elizabeth Seale Cateforis, Surrogate Motherhood: An Argument for Regulation
and a Blueprint for Legislation in Kansas, KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y, Winter 1995, at
101, 101, 105 ("The surrogate mother may have entered into the arrangement for a
variety of reasons. . . ."); see Ruby L. Lee, Note, New Trends in Global Outsourcing
of Commercial Surrogacy: A Call for Regulation, 20 HASTINGS WOMEN'S L.J. 275,
288-89 (2009) (showing that surrogate mothers come from a variety of
demographics).
9 Brock A. Patton, Buying a Newborn: Globalization and the Lack of Federal
Regulation of Commercial Surrogacy Contracts, 79 UMKC L. REV. 507, 512-13
(2010) (discussing the reasons why women choose to act as surrogates).
10 Kimberly D. Krawiec, Altruism and Intermediation in the Market for Babies,
66 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 203, 224 (2009).
n1 Jamie L. Zuckerman, Note, Extreme Makeover-Surrogacy Edition:
Reassessing the Marriage Requirement in Gestational Surrogacy Contracts and the
Right To Revoke Consent in Traditional Surrogacy Agreements, 32 NOVA L. REV.
661, 663-64 (2008) (discussing the different types of gestational surrogacy
arrangements).
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surrogate.12 On the other hand, if the woman is incapable of
producing eggs and cannot carry a child, a donor's eggs are
united with the woman's husband's sperm in order to create the
embryos gestated by the surrogate.s In either case, the
gestational surrogate 4 is not biologically related to the resulting
child." However, that fact has not prevented litigation over
whether the gestational surrogate has parental rights.
The second type of surrogacy arrangement involves a
traditional surrogate. A traditional surrogate is a woman who is
artificially inseminated with the sperm of the intended mother's
husband or the sperm the intended mother acquires from a
donor.' 6 Since the traditional surrogate's eggs are used to create
the child, she is biologically related to the resulting child." As a
consequence, traditional surrogacy agreements usually contain
provisions requiring the surrogate to terminate her parental
rights in order to allow the intended mother to adopt the child.'8
Like in any contract dispute, the courts do not become
involved until one or more of the parties to the contract decide
not to abide by the contract's terms. In a surrogacy situation, the
legal dispute usually arises when the surrogate refuses to
surrender the child to the intended parent or parents. The courts
are called upon to identify the legal parents of the child." The
law dealing with surrogacy is unsettled. The majority of states
1" Ronald Chester, To Be, Be, Be... Not Just To Be: Legal and Social
Implications of Cloning for Human Reproduction, 49 FLA. L. REV. 303, 331 (1997).
13 Lori B. Andrews & Lisa Douglass, Comment, Alternative Reproduction, 65 S.
CAL. L. REV. 623, 631 (1991).
14 "Gestational surrogate" is often defined as a woman who agrees to conceive a
child using reproductive technology without utilizing her own eggs. See, e.g., FLA.
STAT. ANN. § 742.13(5) (West 2012).
15 Bernard Friedland & Valerie Epps, The Changing Family and the U.S.
Immigration Laws: The Impact of Medical Reproductive Technology on the
Immigration and Nationality Act's Definition of the Family, 11 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J.
429, 454 (1997).
16 Steven H. Snyder & Mary Patricia Byrn, The Use of Prebirth Parentage
Orders in Surrogacy Proceedings, 39 FAM. L.Q. 633, 639 (2005).
"1 Emily Stark, Comment, Born to No Mother: In re Roberto d.B. and Equal
Protection for Gestational Surrogates Rebutting Maternity, 16 AM. U. J. GENDER
Soc. POL'Y & L. 283, 287 (2008).
* Sherrie Lynne Russell-Brown, Parental Rights and Gestational Surrogacy: An
Argument Against the Genetic Standard, 23 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 525, 527
(1992).
" See, e.g., J.F. v. D.B., 897 A.2d 1261, 1279 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2006) (stating that
"the designation of who is a 'legal mother' is one ultimately determined by statute
and/or judicial ruling").
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do not have statutes directly addressing the legal issues that
arise as a consequence of surrogacy arrangements." Some state
legislatures have enacted statutes banning the conception of
children using surrogacy arrangements.2 ' Other states have
made surrogacy arrangements illegal.2 2 Thus, in order to
discourage criminal behavior, the courts in those jurisdictions
refuse to enforce surrogacy contracts.2 3 Under the law of at least
twelve states, however, persons may enter into surrogacy
agreements.24
Some commentators contend that state legislatures have not
taken adequate steps to ensure that women entering into
surrogacy arrangements are protected. However, legislators in a
few jurisdictions have enacted legislation that seeks to protect
the interests of the women involved in gestational surrogacy
arrangements.2 5 When the surrogate fails to live up to her end of
the bargain, the intended mother has to turn to the courts for
assistance. Instead of enforcing the contract between the
surrogate and the intended mother, courts rely on different tests
to determine which woman is entitled to be adjudicated as the
legal mother of the child conceived as the result of a surrogacy
agreement. Consequently, the intended mother's claim to the
child is dependent upon the maternity test the court decides to
apply."
20 See Lee, supra note 8, at 289-90 (discussing state regulation of surrogacy).
21 Denise E. Lascarides, Note, A Plea for the Enforceability of Gestational
Surrogacy Contracts, 25 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1221, 1231 (1997).
22 Id.
23 States that fall into this category include Arizona, the District of Columbia,
Indiana, Michigan, and North Dakota. Id. at 1231 & nn.57-58.
24 Those states include Arkansas, California, Florida (if intended parents are
married), Illinois (gestational surrogacy agreements only), New Hampshire, New
Jersey (uncompensated surrogacy agreements only), North Dakota (gestational
surrogacy only), Tennessee (if intended parents are married), Texas (if intended
parents are married), Utah (if intended parents are married), Virginia
(uncompensated agreements where intended parents are married only), and
Washington (uncompensated surrogacy agreements only). See Darra L. Hofman,
"Mama's Baby, Daddy's Maybe:" A State-by-State Survey of Surrogacy Laws and
Their Disparate Gender Impact, 35 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 449, 454-58, 460 (2009)
(providing a table listing the status of surrogacy agreements in the states and the
District of Columbia).
2 See, e.g., 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 47/15 (b) (West 2012).
26 The different theories of maternity will be discussed in Part I.
904 [Vol. 87:899
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This Article is not meant to debate whether surrogacy
contracts should be legal. The purpose of this Article is to
address situations where the surrogate reneges on her promise
and attempts to keep the child. In particular, this Article deals
with the adjudication of maternity after the surrogate has
breached the agreement by failing to turn the child over to the
intended parent or parents. This Article is divided into four
parts. Part I discusses the current ways courts resolve breaches
of surrogacy contracts. Part II evaluates the appropriateness of
legal remedies like damages and specific performance when a
surrogate breaches the contract. Part III explores the manner in
which the equitable remedies of promissory estoppel and unjust
enrichment can be utilized to compensate the intended mother
after the contract breach. Finally, in Part IV, this Article puts
forth a proposal for resolving breaches of surrogacy agreements.
This Article contends that contractual surrogacy obligations
should be treated like any other contractual obligations.
Consequently, courts should take actions to ensure that the
intended mother receives the benefit of her bargain by being
recognized as the child's legal mother. The appropriate way to
accomplish that is to establish a rebuttable presumption that
surrogacy contracts should be specifically enforced.
I. CURRENT RESOLUTION OF BROKEN PROMISES
A. Legislative Solution
The legal recognition of a parent-child relationship" is
important to the parents and the child. It is important to the
parents because it gives them the right to make decisions
regarding the child.28 It also prevents the government from
27 CAL. FAM. CODE § 7601 (West 2014) ("Parent and child
relationship'. . . means the legal relationship existing between a child and the
child's natural or adoptive parents incident to which the law confers or imposes
rights, privileges, duties, and obligations. The term includes the mother and child
relationship and the father and child relationship.").
28 James A. Cosby, Stronger Rights for Parents and Some Affirmative Rights for
Children? No Problem: Changing How We Look at the Family, 6 WHITTIER J. CHILD.
& FAM. ADVOC. 291, 295-97 (2007) (discussing the importance of parental
autonomy); see also Petersen v. Rogers, 445 S.E.2d 901, 903 (N.C. 1994) (showing
that a core parental right is the right of a parent to make decisions about the
upbringing of his or her child).
2013]1 905
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unduly interfering in the parents' relationship with the child."
In some respects, establishment of a legal parent-child
relationship is financially beneficial to the parents. For example,
the custodial parent is usually entitled to receive child support
from the non-custodial parent. Moreover, parents may have the
right to inherit from their children under the intestacy system.ao
This right is important when the child predeceases the parents
and leaves a substantial estate.3 ' Children also benefit from the
existence of a legally recognized parent-child relationship. For
instance, the child's ability to receive financial support from an
adult is dependent on that relationship. That financial support
includes lifetime child support,3 2 inheritance, and government
survivors' benefits. 4
Historically, it was not necessary for the courts to adjudicate
maternity because the identity of the child's legal mother was
easy to ascertain. The familiar phrase "momma's baby, daddy's
maybe" was reflective of the way society viewed maternal status.
Since the woman who gave birth to the child also supplied the
genetic material that created the child, maternity was typically
unchallenged.35  The availability of the reproductive technology
that makes surrogacy possible has changed that fact. As usual,
the law has not kept pace with medical advances.36 Thus, courts
are forced to apply traditional family law principles to novel
situations.
29 See Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 639 (1968) (establishing that parents
have a fundamental right to raise their children without undue governmental
interference).
3o Ronald J. Scalise Jr., Honor Thy Father and Mother?: How Intestacy Law
Goes Too Far in Protecting Parents, 37 SETON HALL L. REV. 171, 199 (2006).
31 Paula A. Monopoli, "Deadbeat Dads": Should Support and Inheritance Be
Linked?, 49 U. MIAMI L. REV. 257, 265 (1994).
32 Adrienne Jennings Lockie, Multiple Families, Multiple Goals, Multiple
Failures: The Need for "Limited Equalization" as a Theory of Child Support, 32
HARv. J.L. & GENDER 109, 114 (2009).
33 Margaret M. Mahoney, Stepfamilies in the Law of Intestate Succession and
Wills, 22 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 917, 920 (1989).
34 Edmund Yan, Chapter 9: Correcting a Subtle Technical Oversight in CERL,
41 McGEORGE L. REV. 641, 642 (2010).
35 David M. Buss, Evolution and Human Mating, 18 HARv. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y
537, 543-44 (1995).
36 Janet L. Dolgin, An Emerging Consensus: Reproductive Technology and the
Law, 23 VT. L. REV. 225, 234 (1998).
906 [Vol. 87:899
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The federal government has generally left family-related
issues like abortion and surrogacy to the states to regulate.17
With regards to paternity, the majority of states have legislation
dealing with the paternity of men involved in assisted
reproduction arrangements, including surrogacy." Courts have
the authority to adjudicate maternity, but state legislatures have
not provided sufficient guidance. Most states do not have
statutes that provide the means for determining legal maternity
when a child is conceived as the result of a surrogacy
arrangement. The state statutes that do address the maternity
issue have taken different approaches to identify the legal
mother of the child. According to the legislators in some states,
the key determinant of motherhood is birth.40 Nonetheless, the
parties are free to reassign legal maternity using a valid
surrogacy contract.4 ' For example, under the provisions of other
statutes, maternity must be determined by evaluating the intent
of the parties.4 2 In some cases, a woman may also be declared
the legal mother if she gestates and gives birth to the child.43 In
states that permit surrogacy contracts to be enforced, the terms
of the contract may control the reassignment of maternity."
Thus, the intended mother is usually found to be the legal
mother if the contract complies with the mandates of the statute
3 See Jonathan Brophy, Comment, Death Is Certain, Are Taxes? Another
Argument for Equality for Same-Sex Couples Under the Code, 34 Sw. U. L. REV. 635,
644 (2005) (stating that the federal government does not deal with family law unless
a fundamental right is threatened or an otherwise legitimate statutory scheme, like
the tax code, bears directly on family life).
3 Browne Lewis, Two Fathers, One Dad: Allocating the Paternal Obligations
Between the Men Involved in the Artificial Insemination Process, 13 LEWIS & CLARK
L. REV. 949, 953 (2009).
3 T.V. v. N.Y. State Dep't of Health, 88 A.D.3d 290, 295, 929 N.Y.S.2d 139, 143
(2d Dep't 2011).
40 See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-10-201(b), (c)(1) (West 2013); see also N.D.
CENT. CODE ANN. § 30.1-04-19 (West 2009) (The woman who gives birth, unless she
is a gestational surrogate, is the child's legal mother.); LA. Civ. CODE ANN. art. 184
(2005) ("Maternity may be established by a preponderance of the evidence that the
child was born of a particular woman, except as otherwise provided by the law.").
41 See, e.g., WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 26.26.101(1), (4) (West 2011).
42 See, e.g., TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 160.760 (West 2005).
4 See, e.g., VA. CODE ANN. § 20-158(A)(1) (West 2000) ("The gestational mother
of a child is the child's mother."). But see Soos v. Superior Court, 897 P.2d 1356, 1361
(Ariz. Ct. App. 1994) (holding a statute violated the equal protection clause where it
named the gestational surrogate the legal mother without giving the biological
mother who donated the eggs the opportunity to prove maternity).
4 See, e.g., VA. CODE ANN. § 20-159(A) (West 2013).
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and is approved by the court.45 Under the terms of the Arkansas
statute, there is a presumption that a child born as a result of a
surrogacy arrangement is the child of the intended parents and
not the surrogate.46 If the contract is invalid47 or unenforceable
for some reason, the default position usually is to recognize the
surrogate as the child's legal mother.4 8
Some jurisdictions treat surrogacy arrangements similar to
adoptions. 4 9 As a result, the surrogate is given a specific period
of time after the birth of the child to give notice of her intent to
keep the child. Once that notice is given, the court designates
the surrogate as the legal mother of the child. 0 Some states only
permit pure gestational surrogate arrangements where the
surrogate is not allowed to use her own eggs.5' In those
jurisdictions, the gestational surrogate is not recognized as the
child's legal mother.52 Thus, gestation is not the standard used to
determine maternity." Finally, if there is a dispute between the
intended mother and the surrogate over custody of the child, in
some jurisdictions, the court will assign maternity based upon
what it considers to be the best interests of the child." The lack
of legislation in this area has led to custody disputes between
surrogates and intended parents.
45 Id. ("A surrogate, her husband, if any, and prospective intended parents may
enter into a written agreement whereby the surrogate may relinquish all her rights
and duties as parent of a child conceived through assisted conception, and the
intended parents may become the parents of the child .. .
* ARK. CODE. ANN. § 9-10-201(b) (West 2013).
4 Several states have statutes setting forth the process for having a surrogacy
arrangement validated. See, e.g., N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 168-B:23(III) (2014); TEX.
FAM. CODE ANN § 160.755 (West 2013).
4 See, e.g., N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 14-18-05 (West 2013); see also VA. CODE
ANN. § 20-158(D).
49 See A.H.W. v. G.H.B., 772 A.2d 948, 954 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 2000)
(providing an example of a state treating gestational surrogacy agreements similar
to adoption agreements).
* N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 168-B:25(IV).
5 See A.H. W., 772 A.2d at 951.
52 Id.
53 See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 160.754(a)(2) (West 2013); see also 750 ILL. COMP.
STAT. ANN. 45/6 (a)(1)(A) (West 2013); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78B-15-801(1)(b) (West
2013).
5 MICH. CoMP. LAws ANN. § 722.861 (West 2014).
[Vol. 87:899908
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B. Judicial Answer
1. Relying on Family Law
When a surrogate breaches the contract by refusing to
surrender the child to the intended parents, the primary question
the court has to answer is the following: Who are the legal
parents of the child conceived as a result of the surrogacy
agreement? In particular, the court has to decide the issue of
maternity. If the court treated the surrogacy contract as just
another contract, the court's main concern would be making the
non-breaching party whole. Nonetheless, when a surrogate
breaks her promise, the judge steps away from contract law and
looks to family law for an answer. Thus, instead of a breach of
contract case, the case is treated as a semi-custody dispute. If
the case were treated as a full-blown custody dispute, the court
would make its decision by applying the best interests of the
child standard." However, the judge's task is not simply to
award custody of the child to either the surrogate or the intended
parents based on whom the judge thinks will make better
parents. The court must first adjudicate the maternal status of
the surrogate and then award custody using the best interests of
the child standard.5 6 The court applied this two-step analysis in
the Baby M case, in which the surrogate was adjudicated as the
legal mother of the child yet still lost custody to the intended
parents."
If the surrogate refuses to turn over the child, the expectant
parents usually hire an attorney to file a lawsuit. Once the
lawsuit is filed, the expectant parents would be confident that
they will prevail. They probably expect the court to issue an
order mandating that the surrogate turn over the baby to them.
Thus, they would be surprised when the court seeks to adjudicate
maternity based upon something other than the plain meaning of
the contract. As a society, we expect valid contracts between
consenting adults to be enforced. Courts have relied upon three
different tests to determine whether the surrogate or the
intended mother should be deemed the legal mother of the
5 See Hathaway v. Bergheim, 648 N.W.2d 349, 351 (S.D. 2002) ("The primary
determination in a custody dispute is to ascertain the best interest of the child.").
m See, e.g., In re C.K.G., 173 S.W.3d 714, 732 (Tenn. 2005).
57 In re Baby M., 537 A.2d 1227, 1234 (N.J. 1988).
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child. 8 The tests appear to be unrelated to the surrogacy
contract. Nevertheless, the judge's selection of a particular test
may be influenced by the judge's opinion about the
appropriateness of surrogacy contracts. For instance, courts that
think that surrogacy contracts should be enforced usually rely on
the intent theory to recognize the intended mother as the child's
legal mother. However, some courts have made it clear that a
woman cannot contract away maternal rights she obtains as a
consequence of being the supplier of the genetic material or the
gestator of the embryo. In this section, this Article summarizes
those tests and puts forth theories that seem to support the
court's decision to apply a specific test to determine maternity.
a. The Adoption Theory-The Genetic Theory of Maternity
In most jurisdictions, for a woman to be recognized as a
child's legal mother, all she has to do is contribute the genetic
material needed to conceive the child. Courts acknowledge that
the only way that a woman should be able to voluntarily give her
biological child to another woman is by complying with the
provisions of the appropriate state adoption statute. The
traditional surrogacy arrangement is similar to a private
adoption, in which the biological mother surrenders custody of
her child to the adoptive parents. However, at least one court
has held that a surrogacy contract cannot serve as an adoption
agreement. When a traditional surrogate fails to surrender the
child to the intended parents, some courts ignore the contract
and treat the surrogate as the biological mother of the child.
Courts reaching that conclusion rely upon the genetic test to
adjudicate maternity."o As the biological mother, the surrogate is
recognized as the legal mother. Once the surrogate is deemed to
be the child's legal mother, she is free to give custody of the child
to the intended mother. Courts applying this standard of
motherhood tend to treat the woman with no biological
connection to the child like an adopting mother. Normally, the
woman who has the biological connection to the child is the
" Erin Y. Hisano, Comment, Gestational Surrogacy Maternity Disputes:
Refocusing on the Child, 15 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 517, 539-43 (2011).
* In re Marriage of Moschetta, 30 Cal. Rptr. 2d 893, 900 (Ct. App. 1994).
60 Ilana Hurwitz, Collaborative Reproduction: Finding the Child in the Maze of
Legal Motherhood, 33 CONN. L. REV. 127, 138 (2000).
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child's natural and legal mother.6 ' A woman can give up that
legal status by voluntarily terminating her parental right and
consenting to the child's adoption in the manner stipulated by
the jurisdiction's adoption statute.6 2
The provisions of state adoption statutes vary. However,
most of the statutes have several requirements in common.
First, the biological parent must give written consent to the
adoption.63 Second, the adoption must be approved by the court
even if it is a private adoption." As a part of that approval
process, the court has the authority to order the home of the
adoptive parents to be evaluated to ensure that the adoption is in
the child's best interests. 5 Finally, in some states, the biological
parent has a certain period of time to withdraw her consent to
the adoption. The adoption is not final until that time period has
expired. In some states, the biological mother is not permitted to
withdraw her consent to the adoption of the child. However, the
consent does not become irrevocable until the adoption has been
finalized by a court. In states following the Uniform Adoption
Act ("UAA"), the biological mother cannot give her consent to
adoption prior to the birth of the child. In addition, the UAA
gives the biological parent a certain period of time to rescind her
consent.6 ' The majority of states have statutes prohibiting a
mother from granting irrevocable consent to adoption before the
child's birth or some period after the birth." The purpose of such
61 Charles P. Kindregan, Jr., Considering Mom: Maternity and the Model Act
Governing Assisted Reproductive Technology, 17 AM. U. J. GENDER Soc. POL'Y & L.
601, 605 (2009).
62 In re Jacob, 86 N.Y.2d 651, 657, 660 N.E.2d 397, 399, 636 N.Y.S.2d 716, 718
(1995); see also Marriage of Moschetta, 30 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 900-01. In Marriage of
Moschetta, the traditional surrogate was adjudicated as the child's legal mother.
Marriage of Moschetta, 30 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 900-01. Since the surrogate did not follow
the consent requirements of the adoption statute, she maintained her status as the
child's legal mother. Id.
6 Cynthia Ellen Szejner, Note, Intercountry Adoptions: Are the Biological
Parents' Rights Protected?, 5 WASH. U. GLOB. STUD. L. REV. 211, 222 & n.72 (2006);
see also Barbara L. Atwell, Surrogacy and Adoption: A Case of Incompatibility, 20
COLUM. HUM. RTs. L. REV. 1, 18 (1988) (discussing reasons for the parental consent
requirement).
6 Yopp v. Batt, 467 N.W.2d 868, 875 (Neb. 1991); McCann v. Doe, 660 S.E.2d
500, 506 n.6 (S.C. 2008).
65 In re Adoption of X.X.G., 45 So. 3d. 79, 84 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2010).
6 Mindy Schulman Roman, Note, Rethinking Revocation: Adoption from a New
Perspective, 23 HOFSTRA L. REV. 733, 745 (1995).
67 UNIF. ADoPTION ACT § 2-408(a)(1) (2012).
m See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-9-208(a) (West 2013).
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laws is to ensure that the mother's consent is knowing,
voluntary, and without duress." Adoption statutes are usually
construed in ways that protect the rights of biological parents.
The requirements governing a legal adoption may influence the
way some courts handle surrogate custody disputes.
According to some courts, the blood connection between the
surrogate and the child is the thing that makes the surrogate the
child's legal mother. Unless her parental rights have been
terminated, the child's biological mother cannot contract away
her parental rights before the child is born. If a woman's
parental rights have not been terminated, her child cannot be
adopted without her consent and her consent must be given
without fraud, duress, or undue influence. 72 This same theory
applies to traditional surrogacy arrangements. As a result, in
order for the intended mother to be recognized as the child's legal
mother, the surrogate has to consent to the adoption of the child
after the child's birth. Like any other adoption case, the
surrogate has the right to change her mind and keep the child.
Nothing in the surrogacy agreement impacts the rights that
biology gives to the traditional surrogate.7 4
If a gestational surrogate is involved in the case, the
surrogate is not recognized as having any maternal rights with
regards to the child. In that case, the woman who supplied the
genetic material used to conceive the child is deemed to be the
child's legal mother. If that woman is not involved in the case, it
is presumed that she would want the intended mother to be
adjudicated as the child's legal mother because she donated her
eggs to that woman. In cases where the intended mother uses
her own eggs, she will be adjudicated as the child's legal mother.
A court would recognize the intended mother as the child's legal
mother based upon the lack of a biological connection between
69 Baby Boy R. v. Velas, 386 S.E.2d 839, 841-43 (W. Va. 1989).
'o In re Adoption of A.S., 912 N.E.2d 840, 848 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009).
7 See, eg., R.R. v. M.H., 689 N.E.2d 790, 796 (Mass. 1998).
72 KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-2114 (West 2013); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 48-22-305(a)(2)
(West 2014).
" Virginia permits a traditional surrogate to terminate the agreement within
180 days of the last assisted conception. VA. CODE ANN. § 20-161(B) (West 2013).
New Hampshire allows the surrogate to opt out of the agreement to relinquish her
rights to the child at any time up to seventy-two hours after birth. N.H. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 168-B:25(IV) (2014).
7 See Atwell, supra note 63, at 15 (arguing that surrogate parenting
arrangements are a type of independent adoption).
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the surrogate and the child. A court would not base its decision
on the fact that the surrogate breached the contract. The action
of a court in New York supports this assertion. The New York
Legislature decided that surrogacy agreements were against the
state's public policy. Thus, it passed a statute making those
types of agreements void and unenforceable." Nevertheless, in a
case involving a gestational surrogate, the New York Supreme
Court held that the intended mother was the legal mother of the
resulting children. The court ignored the existence of the
surrogacy agreement and based its decision on the genetic
connection between the woman and the children.7
Regardless of the existence of a contract, the biological
mother is the child's legal mother unless she takes steps to give
the child up for adoption. As the analysis of Belsito v. Clark 7
illustrates, this theory applies even in situations where the
surrogate does not plan to breach the terms of the agreement.
Doctors implanted in Carol Clark an embryo created using eggs
from her sister, Shelly, and sperm from her brother-in-law,
Anthony.79  As a result of the procedure, Carol became
pregnant.so Prior to the child's birth, a hospital representative
informed Shelly that Carol would be listed on the child's birth
certificate as the birth mother.1 In addition, Shelly found out
that since Carol was not married to Anthony, the child would be
deemed a non-marital child.8 2 Since they were the child's
biological parents, Shelly and Anthony did not want to be forced
to adopt their own child."3 Consequently, Shelly and Anthony
filed an action asking the court to adjudicate them as the child's
legal parents." They also asked the court to order the hospital to
7 N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 122 (McKinney 2014) ("Surrogate parenting contracts
are hereby declared contrary to the public policy of this state, and are void and
unenforceable.").
76 Arredondo v. Nodelman, 163 Misc. 2d 757, 758-59, 622 N.Y.S.2d 181, 182
(Sup. Ct. Queens Cnty. 1994).
7 Id.
7 Belsito v. Clark, 67 Ohio Misc. 2d 54 (Ct. Com. Pl. 1994).
7 Id. at 56.
so Id. at 57.
81 Id. at 58.
82 Id.
83 Id.
84 Id.
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put their names on the child's birth certificate as the birth
parents.ss In light of their marital status, the establishment of
their parentage would have legitimized the child.
In essence, the intended parents wanted the court to treat
them like biological parents instead of adoptive parents. The
court concluded that biology makes a person a legal parent.8 7
Thus, the persons who supply the genetic material used to
conceive the child are the child's biological and legal parents.8 8
In this case, Shelly was recognized as the child's legal mother
because she was the child's biological mother.89 Thus, if the
surrogate had breached the contract, the court would have
ordered her to surrender the child to the intended parents. The
court's decision would have been based upon the biological link
between the intended mother and not on the existence of the
contract. The surrogate would have been treated as a stranger to
the child. As a stranger to the child, the only way the surrogate
would have acquired rights to the child is if the biological mother
had consented to the surrogate obtaining those rights. Since the
biological parents intended to raise the child, that outcome would
never have occurred.90 In some jurisdictions, the provision of
genetic material is not necessary for a woman to be recognized as
a legal mother. Courts in those states reward the surrogate for
the fruits of her labor.
b. The Locke Labor Theory-The Gestational Theory of Maternity
Some courts reason that a woman can earn the right to be a
child's legal mother. The Locke Labor Theory is commonly
taught in first-year property courses. The underlying principle of
the theory is that property ownership is a natural right that a
person acquires because of his or her labor.9' According to Locke,
a person who puts productive labor into creating something is
85 Id.
86 Id.
8 Id. at 65-66.
88 Id.
8 Id. at 66.
90 Dawn Wenk, Note, Belsito v. Clark Ohio's Battle with "Motherhood", 28 U.
TOL. L. REV. 247, 264 (1996).
91 Jessica Berg, Owning Persons: The Application of Property Theory to Embryos
and Fetuses, 40 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 159, 182-83 (2005).
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entitled to claim ownership of the object.9 2 Locke further
contended that since people own their bodies, they own the labor
that stems from their bodies. Hence, people own the fruits of
their productive labor. When a person takes something from
nature and adds his or her labor to it in order to improve or
change it into something useful, that item becomes the property
of the person who contributes the labor.9 4 The person owns the
object because the value of the property comes from the labor
that transformed it from its natural state into something useful.95
For instance, Habitat for Humanity and some other non-profits
help low-income persons to become homeowners by allowing
them to provide "sweat equity" in lieu of making a monetary
down payment.9" Those persons are given credit for the labor
they put into building the house.
In determining maternity, some courts have relied upon the
medical fact that the woman who gestates the child forms a
special bond with that child. The gestational surrogate nurtures
the embryo for forty weeks and helps to convert it into a child.97
During the course of the pregnancy, the gestational surrogate
supplies the hormones that are needed to transform the embryo
into a unique child." Based upon the Locke Labor Theory, some
courts and commentators have concluded that the surrogate
earns the right to be adjudicated as the child's legal mother."
92 Leigh Raymond & Sally K. Fairfax, Fragmentation of Public Domain Law and
Policy: An Alternative to the "Shift-to-Retention" Thesis, 39 NAT. RESOURCES J. 649,
684 (1999).
93 Paul J. Otterstedt, A Natural Rights Approach to Regulatory Takings, 7 TEX.
REV. L. & POL. 25, 34 (2002).
9 Jon M. Garon, Normative Copyright: A Conceptual Framework for Copyright
Philosophy and Ethics, 88 CORNELL L. REV. 1278, 1295 (2003).
9 Eric T. Freyfogle, Owning the Land: Four Contemporary Narratives, 13 J.
LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 279, 282 (1998).
9 John J. Ammann, Affordable Housing and Pro Bono: Habitat for Humanity
Provides Valuable Pro Bono Opportunities, 7 J. AFFORDABLE HOUSING &
COMMUNITY DEV. L. 225, 225 (1998).
9 See Lawrence 0. Gostin, Surrogacy from the Perspectives of Economic and
Civil Liberties, 17 J. CONTEMP, HEALTH L. & POL'Y 429, 435 (2001) (noting the
gestational mother's commitment to nurturing the fetus for nine months or
approximately forty weeks prior to giving birth).
" See generally R. Brian Oxman, Maternal-Fetal Relationships and Nongenetic
Surrogates, 33 JURIMETRICS J. 387, 396-424 (1993) (describing the gestation
process).
9 Scott B. Rae, Parental Rights and the Definition of Motherhood in Surrogate
Motherhood, 3 S. CAL. REV. L. & WOMEN'S STUD. 219, 236 (1994). But see Shoshana
L. Gillers, Note, A Labor Theory of Legal Parenthood, 110 YALE L.J. 691, 709-11
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The surrogate starts out with an embryo and puts in the labor to
change it into a baby. Additionally, during actual labor, the
surrogate works to makes sure that the child comes into the
world safely. Thus, she acquires some property interest in the
child. Courts that take that approach apply the gestation test to
recognize the surrogate as the legal mother of the child. The
surrogate's role as a gestator qualifies her to be the child's legal
mother. Thus, the contract is irrelevant. Once her status as a
gestator makes her the legal mother, these courts refuse to force
the surrogate to give up that title simply because she signed a
contract promising to do so.
The New Jersey case, A.H. W. v. G.H.B., exhibits this
gestation theory of maternity. Andrea and her husband, Peter,
were unable to conceive a child naturally.o After Gina, Andrea's
sister, agreed to serve as a gestational surrogate for the couple,
doctors implanted an embryo, created using Andrea's eggs and
Peter's sperm, into Gina's uterus.1 01 As a result, Gina became
pregnant.10 2 Before Gina gave birth to the child, Andrea and
Peter asked the court to adjudicate them as the child's legal
parents so that their names could appear on the child's birth
certificate. 10 3 Even though Gina supported the petition, the court
did not grant their request. Instead, the court reasoned that the
efforts Gina took to make sure the child was born entitled her to
be classified as the child's gestational mother. Because Gina was
the child's gestational mother, the court held that Gina was the
child's legal mother."o0
In reaching its decision, the court emphasized that a strong
connection is formed between the woman and the child during
the pregnancy and at birth. 0  That connection was not
weakened by the lack of a biological link. The mother-child
relationship develops because of the dependency of the child on
the mother. The woman who supplies the eggs that result in the
(2001) (arguing that the Locke Labor Theory favors awarding custody of the child to
the contracting parents).
10 A.H.W. v. G.H.B., 772 A.2d 948, 949 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 2000).
101 Id.
102 Id.
103 Id. at 950.
10 Id. at 953-54 (holding that, because of the special bond between gestational
mother and child, Gina held the parental rights and could only transfer those rights
with her consent seventy-two hours after the birth).
105 Id. at 953.
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creation of the embryo has a connection to the embryo, but not to
the resulting child. The woman who provides the nutrients
necessary for the embryo to develop into a child is the child's
natural and legal mother. The latter woman is the woman who
gestates the child."'o As a consequence, gestation is the
controlling factor in adjudicating maternity. By applying that
test for adjudicating maternity, the court sought to ensure that
the gestational surrogate received credit for her labor.
Nonetheless, in some states, a woman may labor in vain if she
has indicated that she expects to place the child in the care of the
intended parents.
c. The Expectation Theory-The Intent Theory of Maternity
Despite the lack of a biological connection between the
woman and the child, some courts may honor a woman's
expectations and recognize her as the child's legal mother. One
of the primary purposes of the law is to protect people's
reasonable expectations. This principle is seen in several
different areas of law.10 7  For instance, the Restatement and
several jurisdictions recognize intentional interference with an
expected inheritance or gift as a valid cause of action. 0 Thus,
the law will protect potential heirs from losing the inheritance
they reasonably expect to gain.'09 In some jurisdictions, the law
also recognizes a tort for the interference with business
expectancy." 0 In order to prove this cause of action, the plaintiff
has to show the following: (1) that a valid contractual
relationship or business expectancy existed; (2) that the
1o6 Id.; Hurwitz, supra note 60, at 157-58.
107 Bailey H. Kuklin, The Plausibility of Legally Protecting Reasonable
Expectations, 32 VAL. U. L. REV. 19, 19-20 (1997).
0 Jared S. Renfroe, Comment, Does Tennessee Need Another Tort? The
Disappointed Heir in Tennessee and Tortious Interference with Expectancy of
Inheritance or Gift, 77 TENN. L. REV. 385, 387, 393-95 (2010); RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 774B (1979) ("One who by fraud, duress or other tortious
means intentionally prevents another from receiving from a third person an
inheritance or gift that he would otherwise have received is subject to liability to the
other for loss of the inheritance or gift."); see also Plimpton v. Gerrard, 668 A.2d 882,
885 (Me. 1995) (recognizing the tort of wrongful interference with an expected legacy
or inheritance). But see Munn v. Briggs, 110 Cal. Rptr. 3d 783, 794 (Ct. App. 2010)
(refusing to adopt the tort).
109 Firestone v. Galbreath, 616 N.E.2d 202, 203 (Ohio 1993); Plimpton, 668 A.2d
at 885-86.
110 Matheson v. Stork, 477 N.W.2d 156, 160 (Neb. 1991); Am. Diamond Exch.,
Inc. v. Alpert, 920 A.2d 357, 363-64 (Conn. App. Ct. 2007).
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defendant knew about the person's expectations; (3) that the
defendant's intentional interference caused the plaintiff to lose
the object of his or her expectation; (4) that the defendant's
interference was the result of an improper motive or the
defendant used improper means; and (5) that the plaintiff was
harmed by the defendant's actions."' In fact, one court has
stated that "[clontract law is intended to enforce the expectancy
interests created by the parties' promises so that they can
allocate risks and costs."" 2  Consequently, in contractual
disputes, the court's role is to determine and effectuate the
parties' intentions."3 When a surrogate contract is breached,
courts rely upon the intent test to ensure that the parties'
reasonable expectations are protected.
One of the things that surrogacy agreements have in
common with other contracts is that the parties expect to receive
the thing for which they bargained." 4 The surrogate promises to
gestate and to surrender the child to the intended parents. In
exchange, the intended parents promise to pay the surrogate's
expenses and to abide by other terms of the agreement."' Based
upon the terms of the contract, the intended mother believes that
she will be recognized as the mother of the resulting child.
Courts applying the intent test attempt to fulfill that belief.
Application of the intent test permits the court to attempt to
identify and carry out the wishes of the parties involved in the
process. The court's goal is to ensure that the parties receive the
benefit of their bargains. To accomplish that task, the court
recognizes and honors the intended parents' expectation that
they will be the child's legal parents. This is the case even if the
parties' contractual intent is contrary to the mandates of the
statute."16 Typically, when a surrogate enters into an agreement,
"I Newton Ins. Agency & Brokerage, Inc. v. Caledonian Ins. Grp., 52 P.3d 30, 33
(Wash. Ct. App. 2002).
112 Town of Alma v. Azco Constr., Inc., 10 P.3d 1256, 1262 (Colo. 2000) (en banc);
see also Giampapa v. Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co., 64 P.3d 230, 249 (Colo. 2003)
(Bender, J., concurring); 3 E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, FARNSWORTH ON CONTRACTS
§ 12.1 (3d ed. 2004).
113 Hamilton Ins. Servs., Inc. v. Nationwide Ins. Cos., 714 N.E.2d 898, 900 (Ohio
1999).
114 Jerald V. Hale, Note, From Baby M. to Jaycee B.: Fathers, Mothers, and
Children in the Brave New World, 24 J. CONTEMP. L. 335, 348 (1998).
11 Stephen G. York, A Contractual Analysis of Surrogate Motherhood and a
Proposed Solution, 24 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 395, 397-98 (1991).
116 See, e.g., S.N. v. M.B., 935 N.E.2d 463, 470-71 (Ohio Ct. App. 2010).
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she does not intend to be recognized as the child's legal mother.
Therefore, the surrogate's expectation that the court will permit
her to retain custody of the child is unreasonable. Thus, the
court is not required to take steps to protect her expectations
when it adjudicates maternity. The court's goal is to make sure
that, in the absence of a mutual mistake, the parties get the
benefit of their bargain by honoring the parties' expectations. To
accomplish that task, the court relies on the intent test to ensure
that the surrogate receives the promised money and the couple
receives custody of the child they intended to parent.
Even courts that apply the intent test to determine
maternity may not be solely motivated by the need to make the
surrogate keep her promise. Relying on intent to determine
maternity is different from strictly enforcing the surrogacy
agreement. Intent is not a specific element that is necessary for
a valid contract.'17 In order for a contract to be valid, there must
be an offer, an acceptance, and consideration. 1 8  Once those
elements are proven, courts do not permit a party to void the
contract because he or she did not intend to abide by the terms of
the contract. The enforceability of a contract has nothing to do
with the parties' subjective intentions."' Their objective
intentions are relevant to the formation and enforcement of the
contract.120 Intent is implicit in the elements necessary to create
the contract. The person who makes the offer expresses the
intent to carry out the terms of the agreement. Likewise, the
person who accepts the offer indicates the intent to be governed
by the provisions of the contract. Nonetheless, intent does not
play a vital role in the enforcement of the contract. Contract law
has a strict liability system. The reason the person breaches the
contract is not relevant to the court's determination of
117 Cochran v. Norkunas, 919 A.2d 700, 708 (Md. 2007) (Intent to be bound is
relevant when determining whether there was a manifestation of a mutual assent to
make the contract.); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 21 (1981).
118 Frye v. Speedway Chevrolet Cadillac, 321 S.W.3d 429, 436 (Mo. Ct. App.
2010).
119 Hotchkiss v. Nat'l City Bank of N.Y., 200 F. 287, 293 (S.D.N.Y. 1911), affd
sub nom. Ernst v. Mechs. & Metals Nat. Bank of City of N.Y., 201 F. 664 (2d Cir.
1912), affd, 231 U.S. 50 (1913).
120 Smith v. Boyd, 553 A.2d 131, 133-34 (R.I. 1989).
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damages. 12 1 When a person breaches a contract, the court does
not evaluate whether or not the person intended to abide by the
terms of the agreement.
For instance, if A and B enter into a contract for A to buy B's
house, B is legally obligated to sell the house to A. In the case
where B breaches that contact, the court does not give the
remedy based upon whether or not A intended to become the
owner of the house. If the contract is valid, the court will award
A an appropriate remedy based upon B's breach of the contact.
The remedy will not be based upon the intent of either party.
The same court would probably treat a surrogacy contract
differently. For example, if A and B enter into a contract for A to
act as a surrogate for B, a court applying the intent test will
require A to surrender the resulting child to B. B's right to the
child will be based upon B's intent to be the parent and not on
the validity of the contract. The court will treat A's breach of the
contract as irrelevant to B's maternity. Even though the outcome
will be the same, the court's reasoning will be different. The
Johnson v. Calvertl2 2 case provides an example of this approach.
Mark and Crispina Calvert signed a surrogate contract with
Anna Johnson.123 According to the provisions of the agreement,
Anna was to gestate the couple's embryo.2 The parties agreed
that Anna would give up all rights to the child and turn it over to
the couple.125  Thus, Crispina was to be the child's legal
mother.12 6 In exchange for Anna's services, Mark and Crispina
promised to pay her $10,000 and to insure her life for $200,000. 127
The agreement provided for the couple to pay the $10,000 in
installments.'28 Unfortunately, during the pregnancy, Anna's
relationship with the couple deteriorated.12 9 Consequently, Anna
threatened to keep the child if the Calverts did not immediately
pay her the remainder of the money they owed her.3 0 The
121 George M. Cohen, The Fault Lines in Contract Damages, 80 VA. L. REV. 1225,
1226 (1994).
122 851 P.2d 776 (Cal. 1993).
123 Id. at 778.
124 Id.
125 Id.
126 See id. at 778, 782.
117 Id. at 778.
128 Id.
129 Id.
130 Id.
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Calverts responded to Anna's threat by filing an action asking
the court to adjudicate them as the legal parents of the unborn
child."3 ' When Anna filed her own lawsuit seeking to be
recognized as the child's legal mother, the court consolidated the
cases. 3 2
Anna's claim to the child was based on her role as the
gestator and birth mother.133 Crispina contended that, since the
child was conceived using her eggs, she should be recognized as
the legal mother.'3 4  The California Supreme Court concluded
that both women had legitimate claims to the child.'35
Nonetheless, the court ruled that the child could only have one
legal mother. 3  The court held that the appropriate test for
determining the identity of the legal mother of the child was the
"intent" test. Specifically, the court stated, "[Sihe who intended
to procreate the child-that is, she who intended to bring about
the birth of a child that she intended to raise as her own-is the
natural mother under California law."' The Calverts intended
to have a child from their genetic material. They carried out that
intent by having an embryo created using his sperm and her egg
implanted in Anna. Anna agreed to assist the Calverts in
carrying out their intentions. The child would not exist if the
Calverts had not acted on their intentions. The court did not
recognize Anna's intent to keep the child because it conflicted
with the parties' originally expressed intentions.'3  The court did
not address the issue of a case involving a traditional surrogacy
arrangement. However, a later California decision indicated that
the existence of a traditional surrogacy agreement would have
changed the outcome of the case.13 9  The key factor in
determining maternity was intent and not genetics. The court did
not rule on the enforceability of the contract. Instead, the court
used the information in the contract to ascertain the parties'
131 Id.
132 Id.
133 Id. at 779.
13 Id. at 780.
13 Id. at 781.
13 Id. This holding is consistent with the state's treatment of paternity. See
Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 118 (1989) (California law does not permit a
child to have two legal fathers).
"1 Johnson, 851 P.2d at 782.
13 Id.
139 See In re Marriage of Moschetta, 30 Cal. Rptr. 2d 893, 900-01 (Ct. App.
1994).
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intent. It is possible that if the Calverts had submitted a
nonbinding document, like a letter, to show intent, the court's
analysis would have been the same. The court did not seek to
remedy Anna's breach of the surrogacy contract. It sought to
protect the expectations of the parties. Some persons are
concerned that honoring those expectations may not result in the
child being placed in the best home.
d. Protective Theory-Best Interests of the Child Maternity Test
The tests discussed above are not the end of the story when
it comes to adjudicating maternity. Some people think that a
woman can become a mother if she is the best woman for the job.
Her qualifications depend upon what the particular child
involved in the case needs. This is a protective theory of
maternity because the focus is on protecting the child. The
dissenting justice in Johnson and some legal commentators have
argued that the correct maternity test to apply is the best
interests of the child test.14 0 Under that test, the court would
consider the best interests of the child when determining
whether the surrogate or the intended mother should be
recognized as the child's legal mother. The dissent maintained
that the court was obligated to have the households and lifestyles
of both women evaluated in order to decide which placement
would be in the child's best interests.'"' Under this theory, the
court would ignore the existence of the contract and resolve the
case in the way that protected the interests of the child. In the
interest of fairness and judicial certainty, the courts should
discard the tests for maternity and base their decisions on
contract law.
2. Returning to Contract Law
a. An Explanation
As the above analysis indicates, when faced with the breach
of a surrogacy contract, courts are more comfortable relying on
family law than contract law. If surrogacy contracts were treated
like other types of contracts, courts would deal with breaches of
140 Johnson, 851 P.2d at 798; Hurwitz, supra note 60, at 129; Browne C. Lewis,
Three Lies and a Truth: Adjudicating Maternity in Surrogacy Disputes, 49 U.
LouIsviLLE L. REV. 371, 375, 406-12 (2011).
141 Johnson, 851 P.2d at 798.
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those contracts by relying upon traditional contract remedies.
Thus, the issue becomes whether or not surrogacy contracts are a
special class of contracts that deserve their own unique remedies.
In the next section, this Article argues that surrogacy disputes
should be settled using contract remedies. The subject of most
contracts cannot talk, feel, or die. Therefore, some would argue
that surrogacy contracts are different from other contracts
because they involve children. The concern is that permitting
children to be the subject of contracts is against public policy
because it reduces children to property. Given the history of
slavery in this country, it is understandable that people are
uncomfortable referring to children as property.14 2  However,
adoption, marriage, and other things impacting the welfare of
children are contractual in nature. The key is for legislatures
and courts to put safeguards in place to protect the interests of
children involved in surrogacy arrangements. Children are not
protected where a majority of jurisdictions have not taken steps
to regulate surrogacy arrangments. Another reason why people
hesitate to have a surrogate held to the promises she makes is
the fear that the surrogate may be exploited and devalued.143
That fear is based upon the erroneous perception that surrogates
are poor, uneducated women who are preyed upon by wealthy,
infertile couples. Research indicates that the average surrogate
is a middle-income, educated woman who has had other
children.'"
Courts should enforce the contract in a surrogacy
arrangement. The debate of whether surrogacy contracts should
be permitted should not factor into the court's decision with
regards to the enforceability of such contracts. Persons objecting
to surrogacy should register their complaints with the
legislatures. It is not the courts' job to legislate. Thus, the
surrogate should never be classified as the legal mother of a child
conceived as the result of a surrogacy arrangement, unless
extenuating circumstances warrant that outcome. As previously
142 Christine L. Kerian, Surrogacy: A Last Resort Alternative for Infertile Women
or a Commodification of Women's Bodies and Children?, 12 WIS. WOMEN'S L.J. 113,
153-55 (1997).
14 John Haskell, Note, The Parent Trap: Implications of Surrogacy on
Motherhood, Fatherhood, and the Family, 6 WHITER J. CHILD & FAM. ADVOC. 107,
113 (2006).
I" Elizabeth S. Scott, Surrogacy and the Politics of Commodification, 72 L. &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 109, 138 (2009).
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stated, a key reason to enforce the contract is to honor the
expectations of the parties. 4 5  A woman with the requisite
mental capacity has the legal right to enter into an agreement to
gestate or to conceive a child for another adult woman. The
surrogate should not be permitted to unilaterally change her
mind after the contract has been partially performed and the
child has been conceived using the genetic material of the
intended mother or the sperm of the intended mother's sperm
donor.
There are several reasons why the law should permit the
intended mother to avail herself of contract remedies when the
surrogate refuses to surrender possession of the child. Requiring
the surrogate to keep her promises protects the intended parents,
the courts, and the child. Courts should respect the autonomy of
consenting adults. It is paternalistic to think that an adult
woman is not capable of entering into a legally binding
contract.14 6 The woman agreeing to act as a surrogate is not in
an unequal bargaining position. When infertile couples decide to
use a surrogate, they are usually desperate for a child. That
desperation makes them vulnerable. Thus, they are probably not
in a position to exploit anyone. Moreover, once she conceives the
child, the surrogate is actually in the stronger bargaining
position. For instance, in order to get the intended parents to
pay her more money, the surrogate could threaten to abort or
keep the child.
In the interest of judicial economy, courts should have bright
line rules when it comes to adjudicating maternity in cases
involving surrogates. The clearest rules are those based upon
contract principles. If the surrogate knows that she will be liable
for breach of the contract, she may be reluctant to break her
promise and try to keep the child. Under the current system,
there is no incentive for the surrogate to abide by the terms of
the contract. The use of various tests to determine maternity
encourages surrogates to take their chances in court. With the
way courts handle breaches of surrogacy contracts, the surrogate
16 June R. Carbone, The Role of Contract Principles in Determining the Validity
of Surrogacy Contracts, 28 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 581, 601 (1988).
11 Candlelight Props., L.L.C. v. MIHC Operating Ltd. P'ship, 750 N.E.2d. 1, 10
(Ind. Ct. App. 2001) ("[Als a general rule, the law allows persons of full age and
competent understanding the utmost liberty in contracting; and their contracts,
when entered into freely and voluntarily, will be enforced by the courts." (quoting
Robinson v. Century Pers., Inc., 678 N.E.2d 1268, 1269-70 (Ind. Ct. App. 1997))).
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has a fifty-fifty chance of being declared the legal mother of the
child. Those odds rewards surrogates for breaching the
contracts.
Relying on contract remedies to address breaches of
surrogacy contracts will also lead to judicial consistency. If a
person breaches a contract, there are a finite number of remedies
available. Thus, people can usually predict the outcome of a
breach of contract case. Treating breaches of surrogacy contracts
like breaches of other contracts will also deter surrogates from
reneging on their promises. It may also discourage some women
from agreeing to be surrogates because they know that they are
contracting away their right to keep the child. This may weed
out women who are not emotionally equipped to be surrogates.
Due to the lack of consistency under the current system, a breach
of a surrogacy contract typically results in a custody dispute.
Custody disputes are never beneficial to children. If the dispute
occurs after the child is born, the child may eventually be
separated from the woman to whom the child has become
attached. Some courts have recognized these concerns and
treated surrogacy custody disputes as breaches of contract cases
and not custody disputes.
b. An Example
When it comes to strictly enforcing surrogacy contracts, the
law treats gestational surrogacy arrangements different from
traditional surrogacy arrangements. For example, the Illinois
Gestational Surrogacy Act specifically states that, if the
gestational surrogate breaches the contract, the intended parents
are entitled to the appropriate legal and equitable remedies."'
The Ohio Appellate Court recently decided a surrogacy contract
dispute in favor of the intended mother.148 An unmarried woman
purchased sperm and eggs from anonymous donors.149 Then, she
entered into a contract with a gestational surrogate.10 Both the
surrogate and the intended mother obtained independent legal
advice and counsel before entering into the agreement. 5 1 When
the surrogate gave birth to twins, the intended mother tried
147 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 47/55 (West 2014).
*4 S.N. v. M.B., 935 N.E.2d 463, 473 (Ohio Ct. App. 2010).
1 Id. at 464-65.
150 Id. at 465.
15 Id.
2013]1 925
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
unsuccessfully to adopt them. 15 2  Since they were born
prematurely, the twins had a lot of health problems. 5 3
Unfortunately, one of the babies died less than two months after
being born.15 4 The remaining baby underwent two surgeries and
spent a substantial amount of time in the hospital. 5 5
After the baby was released from the hospital, the surrogate
permitted an unrelated third party to care for the baby. 5  The
surrogate refused to give the baby to the intended mother. 5 1
Consequently, the intended mother filed suit asking the court to
order DNA tests to show that the surrogate was not the child's
biological parent.'18  She also sought to have the surrogate's
maternity disestablished.' 9 The court waived DNA testing after
both women admitted that neither was biologically related to the
child.o Nonetheless, both women sought to be adjudicated as
the child's legal mother.161
The trial court granted the intended mother partial
summary judgment on the issue of parentage.'6 2 The trial court
concluded that the surrogate was presumed to be the child's legal
mother because she gave birth to the child.163 According to the
trial court, that presumption was rebutted by the fact that the
surrogate was not the child's biological mother." The
presumption was further rebutted because the surrogate
voluntarily signed the surrogacy contract in which she
relinquished and waived her right to be the child's natural and
legal parent. 6 5 Therefore, the trial court ordered the surrogate
to surrender the child to the intended mother.6 6
152 Id.
13 Id.
15 Id.
15s Id.
1 Id.
167 Id.
15 Id.
16' Id.
160 Id.
161 Id. at 465-66.
162 Id. at 466.
16 Id.
'" Id. at 467.
165 Id.
16 Id.
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The surrogate appealed the trial court's decision, claiming
that the trial court erred by adjudicating the intended mother as
the legal mother and giving her temporary physical custody of
the child without a hearing.167 The surrogate's main argument
was that the presumption of her maternity had not been rebutted
by the fact that she signed the surrogacy contract. 6 8 In order to
resolve the case, the appellate court analyzed the state's
parentage statute.6 9  The appellate court determined that the
parentage statute provided that a woman who gives birth is
presumed to be the child's natural mother.170 Under the terms of
the statute, a man's presumption of paternity could be rebutted
by clear and convincing evidence. The appellate court reasoned
that a woman's presumption of maternity could likewise be
rebutted.17' The surrogate was presumed to be the child's legal
mother because she gestated and gave birth to the child.17 2
However, her maternity could be rebutted by evidence that she
did not intend to parent the child."' The court found this
evidence by reading the terms of the surrogacy agreement. 74
The court relied upon contract principles to force the
gestational surrogate to abide by the terms of the surrogacy
agreement. 7 5 In particular, the court stated, "[W]e must apply
the law of contracts in interpreting the validity of the surrogacy
agreement in the instant matter."'7 6 The court was influenced by
the fact that, in deciding an earlier gestational surrogacy case,
the Ohio Supreme Court had stated that the "right and just"
thing to do was to require the parties to a surrogacy agreement to
honor the contract that they executed.'7 7 First, the court found
that the parties had entered into a valid written contract. 78 The
intended mother accepted the surrogate's offer to gestate the
embryo. The consideration for the contract was the intended
mother's agreement to pay the surrogate's pregnancy-related
167 Id.
16 Id. at 468-69.
"I Id. at 469.
170 Id. at 470.
171 Id.
172 Id.
173 Id.
174 Id.
175 Id. at 470-71.
176 Id. at 471.
177 J.F. v. D.B., 879 N.E.2d 740, 741 (Ohio 2007).
178 S.N., 935 N.E.2d at 471.
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medical expenses, life insurance premiums, and living
expenses."' Second, the court determined that both women were
old enough and had the requisite mental capacity to enter into a
legal contract.s 0 In addition, the surrogate and the intended
mother negotiated the terms of the contract with the assistance
of attorneys.' Third, the court concluded that the terms of the
contract required the surrogate to relinquish physical custody of
the child and to take actions to ensure that the intended mother
was adjudicated as the child's legal mother.182 Lastly, the court
decided that the surrogate was not forced to sign the contract.'8 3
Thus, the appellate court held that the trial court correctly
enforced the terms of the contract.'" The intended mother
abided by all of the terms of the contract. Therefore, she
deserved to receive the benefit of her bargain. In order to meet
the parties' expectations, both the trial court and the appellate
court adjudicated the intended mother as the child's legal
mother. Other courts should follow the approach of this court
and apply contract law to breaches of surrogacy contracts. Then,
the intended parents will be given the opportunity to benefit
from available contract remedies.
II. LEGALLY REMEDYING THE BREACH: DAMAGES AND SPECIFIC
PERFORMANCE
This section addresses the legal remedies available to an
intended mother when the surrogate attempts to deprive her of
custody of the promised child. A person breaches a contract
when he or she does not perform the action promised in the
contract.8 8 The two main legal remedies for breach of contract
are damages and specific performance. 86  The underlying
purpose of any contract remedy is to make the non-breaching
no Id.
180 Id.
181 Id.
I82 Id. at 471-72.
'8 Id. at 471.
1' Id. at 471-72.
' Nat'1 City Bank of Cleveland v. Erskine & Sons, Inc., 110 N.E.2d 598, 603
(Ohio 1953).
18 Lewis v. Woodbine Say. Bank, 165 N.W. 410, 411 (Iowa 1917).
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party whole and to protect the party's expectation interests.1 87
This purpose is accomplished by putting that party in the
position he or she would have been in had the contract not been
breached.' In the context of a surrogacy arrangement, damages
may offer some solace to the contracting parents, but it is no
substitute for the child they hoped to raise.
A. Damages
The two primary types of damages are compensatory or
actual damages and special damages. In certain cases, courts
may award nominal damages to compensate for breaches
resulting in no actual damages 9 and punitive damages to deter
certain types of bad behavior.190 Compensatory damages are
awarded to compensate the non-breaching party for the expenses
he or she actually suffers as a consequence of the breach. These
damages are awarded based upon the non-breaching party's
expectancy.' 9' The correct measure of compensatory damages is
the amount of economic loss that the non-breaching party
actually suffers. 92 Actual damages are economic damages, which
may be either direct or indirect.'13 Direct damages are designed
to compensate persons for losses that the court presumes to have
been foreseen or contemplated by the breaching party. Indirect
or consequential damages are the foreseeable ones that result
indirectly from the breach.x'9 In the context of a surrogacy
187 John Y. Gotanda, Recovering Lost Profits in International Disputes, 36 GEO.
J. INT'L L. 61, 64 (2004); see also Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Bucyrus-Erie Co., 388
N.W.2d 584, 592 (Wis. 1986).
1" Ernest J. Weinrib, Punishment and Disgorgement as Contract Remedies, 78
CHI.-KENT L. REv. 55, 56 (2003).
188 Brock v. King, 629 S.E.2d 829, 835 (Ga. Ct. App. 2006) (quoting Bottersbusch
v. Preussag Int'l Steel Corp., 609 S.E.2d 141, 146-47 (Ga. Ct. App. 2004)).
"0 In order for punitive damages to be awarded in breach of contract cases, the
conduct causing the breach must be a tort. Morrow v. L.A. Goldschmidt Assocs., Inc.,
492 N.E.2d 181, 184 (Ill. 1986).
1e1 Midland Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Mercy Clinics, Inc., 579 N.W.2d 823, 831 (Iowa
1998) (These damages are the person's "'expectation interest' or 'benefit of the
bargain' damages.").
112 Giampapa v. Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co., 64 P.3d 230, 240 (Colo. 2003).
193 Wade & Sons, Inc. v. Am. Standard, Inc., 127 S.W.3d 814, 823 (Tex. Ct. App.
2003); Gregory K. Morgan & Albert E. Phillips, Design Professional Contract Risk
Allocation: The Impact of Waivers of Consequential Damages and Other Limitations
of Liabilities on Traditional Owner Rights and Remedies, 33 J.C. & U.L. 1, 12
(2006).
194 Valley Nissan, Inc. v. Davila, 133 S.W.3d 702, 713 (Tex. Ct. App. 2003).
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situation, the actual damages would include the surrogate's
medical expenses, the cost of the reproductive technology used to
make the pregnancy possible, the surrogate's living expenses,
and other expenses that the intended parents pay in accordance
with the dictates of the surrogacy contract.'9 5  Consequential
damages might include loss of wages or leave time if the intended
parents took time off from work to assist the surrogate during
the pregnancy.
Special damages are damages that the parties could
reasonably foresee occurring.'9 6  The person seeking special
damages has the burden of proving that he or she has been
damaged. In order to satisfy that burden, the person must show
that (1) the defendant's breach of the contract was the cause of
his or her actual loss; and (2) the defendant should have
reasonably foreseen that the loss would occur if the defendant
failed to fulfill the terms of the contract. In addition, the plaintiff
must prove the amount of his or her loss with a reasonable
degree of certainty.'97 The intended mother will have no problem
satisfying the conditions necessary to receive special damages.
First, the loss of the child and the money paid to have the child
conceived will result from the surrogate's refusal to surrender
custody of the child. Second, the surrogate definitely would have
foreseen that her failure to abide by the terms of the contract
would cause the intended mother's losses. Lastly, the intended
mother will probably have receipts and medical bills showing the
amount of money she lost because of the surrogate's actions. In
the context of a surrogacy arrangement, special damages may
include the cost of the tests to confirm the surrogate's pregnancy
and the money the intended parents spent to prepare their home
and lives for the arrival of the child.
19' Some persons claim that the intended parents pay between $75,000 and
$150,000. Morgan Holcomb & Mary Patricia Byrn, When Your Body Is Your
Business, 85 WASH. L. REV. 647, 649 (2010) (discussing the costs of surrogacy);
BROWNE LEWIS, THE INHERITANCE RIGHTS OF CHILDREN IN THE UNITED STATES:
CASES AND MATERIALS 315 (2010) (discussing the costs associated with the
surrogacy process).
'9 Lewis Jorge Constr. Mgmt., Inc. v. Pomona Unified Sch. Dist., 102 P.3d 257,
261-62 (Cal. 2004).
197 S.C. Fed. Say. Bank v. Thornton-Crosby Dev. Co., 399 S.E.2d 8, 11 (S.C. Ct.
App. 1990).
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Nominal damages are usually awarded in breach of contract
cases if they can be proven.19 8 To prove nominal damages, the
plaintiff only needs to prove that a breach occurred. Nominal
damages are trivial damages that are not meant to compensate
the breaching party. The courts award them to acknowledge that
the person has suffered some harm just by the fact that the
contract was breached.199 Whenever the surrogate refuses to
relinquish her claim to the child, she has breached the surrogacy
contract. That breach entitles the intended parents to nominal
damages. Nonetheless, in surrogacy cases, nominal damages will
not be relevant because the intended parents will always be able
to show some actual damages. Even in uncompensated
surrogacy arrangements, the intended parents have to pay the
surrogate's medical expenses.
Punitive damages are awarded in order to punish the
breaching party for his or her actions and to discourage others
from acting in a similar manner.200 In most jurisdictions,
punitive damages are not awarded for breach of contract. In
order to obtain punitive damages, the non-breaching party has to
prove that the defendant committed an independent tort. 01 To
receive punitive damages, it may be possible for the intended
mother to prove that the surrogate committed the tort of
conversion when she refused to surrender the child.202 A person
is liable for conversion if he or she deprives another person of his
or her property. 203 To successfully prove conversion, the intended
mother would have to show the following: (1) She has a property
interest in the child; (2) She has a right to immediately possess
the child; (3) The surrogate is wrongly keeping the child; and
(4) She has made a demand for possession of the child.2 04
198 Kronos, Inc. v. AVX Corp., 81 N.Y.2d 90, 95, 612 N.E.2d 289, 292, 595
N.Y.S.2d 931, 934 (1993).
199 Hummel v. Mid Dakota Clinic, P.C., 526 N.W.2d 704, 709 (N.D. 1995).
200 Frank J. Cavico, Jr., Punitive Damages for Breach of Contract-A Principled
Approach, 22 ST. MARY'S L.J. 357, 442-43 (1990).
201 Burns v. Prudential Sec., Inc., 857 N.E.2d 621, 652-53 (Ohio Ct. App. 2006).
202 Hicks v. Lilly Enters., Inc., 608 P.2d 186, 189 (Or. Ct. App. 1980) (explaining
that punitive damages may be allowed in conversion actions).
203 Senfeld v. Bank of Nova Scotia Trust Co., 450 So. 2d 1157, 1160-61 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1984).
204 IOS Capital, Inc. v. Phx. Printing, Inc., 808 N.E.2d 606, 610 (Ill. App. Ct.
2004).
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The intended mother should be able to easily prove the last
three elements. The biggest hurdle she would have to overcome
would be convincing the court that she has a property interest in
the child. However, this obstacle is not insurmountable because
the law has recognized a property interest in genetic material.
For instance, in Hecht v. Superior Court, the court recognized a
man's right to leave his sperm to his girlfriend by will.2 05 A
woman should have the same property interest in her eggs and in
the embryos created from them.20 6 The court in Moore v. Regents
of the University of California concluded that a man had no
property interest in his cells once doctors removed them from his
body.207 Nonetheless, the court decided that the man had the
authority over them as long as they were in his body.208 As a
result, doctors could not remove those cells without his informed
consent.20 9 Applying this reasoning to the genetic supplier of the
eggs in a surrogacy situation, a woman has control over her eggs
as long as they are inside her body. The eggs cannot be used
unless the woman gives her informed consent. This analysis
holds true whether or not the intended mother uses her own eggs
or eggs that she has acquired from a donor. In either case, she
has an ownership interest in the eggs.
The surrogate is liable for conversion whether or not she is a
traditional or gestational surrogate. If she is a traditional
surrogate, she would have converted the sperm supplied by the
intended parents. If she is a gestational surrogate she would
have converted the embryo created by the intended parents.
Thus, the intended mother should be able to prove the tort of
conversion. Even if the intended mother is able to prove that the
defendant committed a tort, in order to receive punitive damages,
she may also have to prove that the surrogate's breach was
205 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d 275, 276-77, 283 (Ct. App. 1993).
206 Erik B. Seeney, Note, Moore 10 Years Later-Still Trying To Fill the Gap:
Creating a Personal Property Right in Genetic Material, 32 NEW ENG. L. REV. 1131,
1170 (1998) (arguing for a recognition of a property right in genetic material).
207 Moore v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 793 P.2d 479, 489 (Cal. 1990) (in bank).
208 See id. at 488-89 (stating that the plaintiff did not have a continuing interest
in his cells after they were excised, implying that he did have a property interest in
them before the cells were excised); Id. at 502 (Broussard, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
20" Id. at 493; see Roger F. Friedman, Comment, It's My Body and I'll Die If I
Want To: A Property-Based Argument in Support ofAssisted Suicide, 12 J. CONTEMP.
HEALTH L. & POLY 183, 208 (1995).
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motivated by some type of evil intent.2 10 For instance, if the
intended mother is able to show that the surrogate entered into
the agreement with no intentions of surrendering the child, she
may be able to get punitive damages. When there is a sufficient
reason not to award damages, the court has the authority to
order the surrogate to specifically perform the contract.
B. Specific Performance
A and B signed a contract for A to construct a building for B.
When the building was about fifty percent complete, A refused to
continue working on the building. In that case, damages are an
appropriate remedy because B can use the money received from
A to hire someone else to complete construction of the building.
On the other hand, in a situation where A contracts with B for A
to buy B's house and B decides that he does not want to sell the
house to A, the outcome may be different. In that case, damages
will not put A in the position that A would have been in had B
not breached the contract, because there is only one house
exactly like B's house. Thus, an award of money damages will
not permit A to obtain the benefit of her bargain. The only way
for A to be made whole is for the court to order B to specifically
perform the contract and sell the house to A. This hypothetical
illustrates one of the reasons why specific performance is the best
remedy to cure the breach of a surrogacy contract.
A contracts with B for B to gestate A's embryo. A pays for all
of the fertility treatments. Before implantation of A's embryo
into B or before B conceives a child from A's embryo, B decides
that she does not want to carry A's child, so she refuses to
perform her part of the contract. Damages are an appropriate
remedy because A can use the money damages to find another
surrogate to gestate A's embryo. However, once B becomes
pregnant or gives birth, damages are not adequate. The only
way for A to be made whole is to receive custody of the child
because there is only one child exactly like the child conceived
using A's embryo. Courts have always concluded that specific
performance is the proper remedy when a land contract is
210 Guarantee Abstract & Title Co. v. Interstate Fire & Cas. Co., 652 P.2d 665,
667 (Kan. 1982).
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breached because land is unique."' That same logic can be
applied to a surrogacy agreement because children are not
fungible.
If the surrogate breaches the contract before she has
conceived the child, she should be required to pay damages. In
that instance, the intended parents can be made whole. That is
not the case after the child is born because money cannot
adequately make up for the loss of a child. The trickier case is
where the surrogate changes her mind after conception of the
child, but before the birth of the child. Once the fetus is viable
enough to make abortion illegal under the state's law, the court
should establish a presumption that she intends to perform the
contract. Thus, if she breaches after that time, the court should
order her to specifically perform the contract. Prior to that time,
the woman always has the right to change her mind and abort
the fetus.
Where surrogacy contracts are legal, courts should enforce
the contracts. If the surrogate breaches the contract by refusing
to turn the child over to the intended mother, the court should
require specific performance instead of damages. The remedy
stage of a trial is designed to put the intended mother in the
position she would have been in if the other party had not
breached the contract.21 2 Awarding specific performance is the
most accurate way for the courts to accomplish that goal because
it gives the non-breaching party the exact performance that she
anticipated.2 13 In situations involving the breach of a surrogacy
agreement, specific performance is the proper remedy because
monetary damages are inadequate, it satisfies the expectations of
the parties, and the subject of the contract, the child, is unique.
The court has the discretion to award specific performance as a
matter of fairness.214
211 Thomas S. Ulen, The Efficiency of Specific Performance: Toward a Unified
Theory of Contract Remedies, 83 MICH. L. REV. 341, 364 (1984).
212 Richard R.W. Brooks, Essay, The Efficient Performance Hypothesis, 116 YALE
L.J. 568, 577-78 (2006) (showing that specific performance can be used to place both
parties in the position they would have been in had there not been a breach).
213 Jonathan Levy, Against Supercompensation: A Proposed Limitation on the
Land Buyer's Right To Elect Between Damages and Specific Performance as a
Remedy for Breach of Contract, 35 LoY. U. CHI. L.J. 555, 585 (2004); see also Ulen,
supra note 211, at 364-65.
214 Alan Schwartz, The Case for Specific Performance, 89 YALE L.J. 271, 272
(1979).
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Specific performance is usually awarded in cases where
damages are inadequate because of the uniqueness of the item
that is the subject of the contract.2 15 Moreover, specific
performance is an appropriate remedy when it is difficult to
calculate monetary damages.2 16 Even if the courts are able to put
a price tag on the harm suffered by the non-breaching party,
monetary damages may not be appropriate because the
breaching party may have little or no financial resources.2 17
Courts usually do not grant specific performance if it would
result in a situation that is unjust, oppressive, or
unconscionable.2 18 Courts are also reluctant to award specific
performance because it may lead to judicial inefficiency. If the
court forces the breaching party to fulfill the terms of the
contract, the court may be given the difficult task of monitoring
the party's actions. The costs to the court of supervising the
performance of the breaching party may be inefficiently high.2 19
In order to determine if specific performance is warranted,
the court will typically balance the equities between the
parties.22 0 The party seeking specific performance has the
burden of proving that it is the correct remedy in his or her case.
In order to compel specific performance, the court has to find the
following: (1) the existence of a valid contract; and (2) that the
party seeking specific performance has performed or is prepared
to perform his or her obligations under the contract.2 2 '
Applying the above stated law to a surrogacy situation, it
appears that specific performance is an appropriate remedy in a
case involving the breach of a surrogacy contract. First, as
indicated earlier, the subject of the contract, like all children, is
unique. Children have never been considered to be
interchangeable. Prior to entering into a surrogacy arrangement,
the intended parents often take steps to ensure that the resulting
215 Paul G. Mahoney, Contract Remedies and Options Pricing, 24 J. LEGAL
STUD. 139, 154 (1995).
216 Deepa Varadarajan, Note, Tortious Interference and the Law of Contract: The
Case for Specific Performance Revisited, 111 YALE L.J. 735, 738 (2001).
217 Schwartz, supra note 214, at 284 & n.44.
218 Asifa Quraishi, Comment, From a Gasp to a Gamble: A Proposed Test for
Unconscionability, 25 U.C. DAvIS L. REV. 187, 191-92 (1991).
219 See Ulen, supra note 211, at 398.
220 Campbell v. Carr, 603 S.E.2d 625, 627 (S.C. Ct. App. 2004).
221 Pluhacek v. Neb. Lutheran Outdoor Ministries, Inc., 420 N.W.2d 286, 288
(Neb. 1988); see also Dixon v. Malouf, 70 A.D.3d 763, 763, 894 N.Y.S.2d 127, 128 (2d
Dep't 2010).
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child has certain attributes. For example, if the persons are
using donor gametes, they typically make sure that the donors
have physical characteristics similar to theirs.22 2 The fact that
the persons are choosing to use a surrogate rather than to adopt
indicates that they do not want just any child; they want a child
they helped create.
Second, damages are not an appropriate remedy for the
breach of a surrogacy contract because damages are difficult to
calculate. It is relatively easy to compute the money the
intended parents provided for the surrogate's medical and
childbirth expenses.2 23 Nonetheless, there are other damages
that are not readily quantifiable. The loss of a child is a
devastating event for a parent. When the surrogate breaches the
contract by refusing to surrender the child to the intended
parents, those persons have lost a child. During the surrogate's
pregnancy, the intended parents usually bond with the child.
They attend the prenatal appointments, choose the name, and
decorate a nursery.22 4 If the surrogate is permitted to pay
damages and keep the child, the intended parents are not going
to be adequately compensated because money is not sufficient to
ease the harm caused by the loss of the child. The only thing
that could make the couple whole is for the court to order the
surrogate to perform the contract.
Third, the award of specific performance may be the only
way for the non-breaching party to be made whole. Most
surrogates are women of modest means.22 5 Therefore, the
breaching surrogate may not have the financial resources to
satisfy a monetary judgment. If the court does not consider
specific performance to be an option, the intended parents may
end up losing the child and being stuck with a worthless
judgment. In this situation, specific performance is fair to all of
the parties involved. The surrogate is not disadvantaged because
she received her bargained-for expectations. The intended
parents receive the benefit of the bargain by being adjudicated as
the child's legal parents.
222 Keith J. Cunningham, Comment, Surrogate Mother Contracts: Analysis of a
Remedial Quagmire, 37 EMORY L.J. 721, 742 (1988).
22 Sharon L. Tiller, Note, Litigation, Legislation, and Limelight: Obstacles to
Commercial Surrogate Mother Arrangements, 72 IOWA L. REV. 415, 420 (1987).
1 Alison Harvison Young, Reconceiving the Family: Challenging the Paradigm
of the Exclusive Family, 6 AM. U. J. GENDER & L. 505, 541 (1998).
225 Andrews & Douglass, supra note 13, at 673-74.
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The risks posed by awarding specific performance are not
relevant to a surrogacy situation. Courts are reluctant to
specifically enforce personal service contracts because they may
be perceived as sanctioning involuntary servitude.22 6 First, a
surrogate agreement is not simply a service contract. The couple
is not contracting solely for the surrogate's services. They are
contracting for the woman's services and the resulting child.
People are uncomfortable acknowledging that the contract is
partially for the child because that seems too much like baby-
selling.27 Nonetheless, if asked, the parties to the contract would
admit that the crucial part of the contract is the child.
Even if a surrogacy agreement is considered to be a service
contract, specific performance is still an appropriate remedy. By
enforcing the contract, the court will not be helping to place the
surrogate in bondage because, once the child is born, the
surrogate's services end. However, in order to ensure the
fulfillment of the contract, if the court ordered the surrogate to
get pregnant against her will or issued an injunction to prevent
the surrogate from having an abortion, that would be against
public policy because it would be a form of involuntary
servitude.2 2 8 After the child is born, that is not a concern. The
intended parents have performed their part of the contract and
are entitled to specific performance on the part of the surrogate.
Courts are also worried about having to monitor to make sure
that the breaching party obeys the court's order and performs the
contract.2 2 9 This problem will not arise in a surrogacy situation
because once the child is born, the court's role in the transaction
can be minimal. 23 0  All the court has to do is recognize the
intended parents as the legal parents and to award them custody
of the child.
226 Flavia Berys, Comment, Interpreting a Rent-a-Womb Contract: How
California Courts Should Proceed When Gestational Surrogacy Arrangements Go
Sour, 42 CAL. W. L. REV. 321, 331-32 (2006).
227 Atwell, supra note 63, at 44-51.
22 Woolley v. Embassy Suites, Inc., 278 Cal. Rptr. 719, 726-27 (Ct. App. 1991).
229 Stewart E. Sterk, Restraints on Alienation of Human Capital, 79 VA. L. REV.
383, 387-88 (1993); see also Zannis v. Lake Shore Radiologists, Ltd., 392 N.E.2d 126,
129 (Ill. App. Ct. 1979).
230 Barbara K. Kopytoff, Surrogate Motherhood: Questions of Law and Values,
22 U.S.F. L. REV. 205, 233 (1988).
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Once the legislature in a state indicates that surrogate
contracts are acceptable, the courts should treat them just like
any other contract.2 3' If the legislature is concerned about
surrogacy agreements, it should regulate the process or ban it. If
a surrogate wants to rescind the contract because she cannot
bear to part with the child, the court should overlook her
emotional state and enforce the contract. In the interests of
judicial consistency and fairness, courts should honor the
decision made by the parties and enforce the surrogacy contract.
The surrogate should not be permitted to change her mind and
keep the baby. As long as the contract is not unconscionable2 32
and does not violate other contract principles, the courts should
enforce the contract.
When the court ignores a valid contract and permits the
surrogate to keep the child, in essence, the court is reforming 234
or rescinding2 35 the contract. Neither of those actions is
appropriate unless the surrogate takes some type of affirmative
step to demonstrate that she is entitled to one of those remedies.
When the court ignores the contract and awards custody of the
child to the surrogate, it sets a bad precedent. The surrogate
does not have an incentive to honor the terms of the contract.
Therefore, she may be willing to take her chances in court. A
protracted custody battle is never in the child's best interests.3
In fact, all parties involved will be hurt by the litigation.
The court's action seems like reformation because, instead of
forcing her to honor the contract, the court is allowing the
surrogate to unilaterally change her mind. The purpose of
reformation is to reform the written contract so that it reflects
231 Amy M. Larkey, Note, Redefining Motherhood: Determining Legal Maternity
in Gestational Surrogacy Arrangements, 51 DRAKE L. REV. 605, 618 (2003).
2 Courts will not enforce unconscionable contracts. Rite Color Chem. Co. v.
Velvet Textile Co., 411 S.E.2d 645, 647-48 (N.C. Ct. App. 1992).
23 Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 350 F.2d 445, 449 (D.C. Cir.
1965) ("Unconscionability has generally been recognized to include an absence of
meaningful choice on the part of one of the parties [(procedural unconscionability)]
together with contract terms which are unreasonably favorable to the other party
[(substantive unconscionability)].").
1 Michal S. Gal, Harmful Remedies: Optimal Reformation of Anticompetitive
Contracts, 22 CARDozo L. REV. 91, 93 (2000) (discussing the goals of contract
reformation).
2' Rescission is about fairness. Hornback v. Wentworth, 132 P.3d 778, 781
(Wash. Ct. App. 2006).
"6 Melissa Douthart Philbrick, Agreements To Arbitrate Post-Divorce Custody
Disputes, 18 COLuM. J.L. & Soc. PROBS. 419,426-28 (1985).
938 [Vol. 87:899
ENFORCING SURROGACY PROMISES
the parties' intended bargain.2 3  The court cannot rely on the
doctrine to explicitly or implicitly rewrite the contract based upon
the court's view of what is socially acceptable. Reformation is
only available where the following circumstances are present:
there is an agreement that is a consequence of the meeting of the
parties' minds; the parties consent to have the agreement put
into writing; a writing is drafted allegedly based upon that
agreement; the terms of the writing and the agreement are in
conflict; and a legal basis exists for the court to reform the
writing to conform with the agreement.2 38 A unilateral mistake
is not a ground for reformation. 23 9 Reformation is not necessary
in a surrogacy arrangement because there is usually no conflict
between the written contract and the agreement made by the
parties. The surrogate refuses to abide by the terms of the
agreement because she wants to keep the child, not because she
thinks that she has a right to do so.
The court appears to be rescinding the contract because the
surrogate is not obligated to perform by surrendering the child to
the intended parents. Rescission of a contract is the annulling,
abrogating, or unmaking of a contract. The remedy of rescission
functions to restore the parties to their pre-contract position. In
essence, the parties are put in the same position they were in
prior to the making of the contract.2 40 In the case of a surrogacy
agreement, rescission is not an appropriate remedy because the
parties can never be restored to their original positions. After
the birth of the child, one of the previously childless women is
going to be a legal mother. The person who loses the child will be
in a more adverse position than she was in at the time she
entered into the contract. Under certain circumstances, the
intended parents may not have a legal remedy. If no legal
remedy is available, the court should evaluate the facts to
determine if equity permits it to offer the intended parents some
form of relief.
2' Edward William Barnett, Note, Contracts-Mistake-Reformation Not
Permitted For Mutual Mistake as to Extent of Grantor's Interest.-Metzler v. Bolen,
137 F. Supp. 457 (D.N.D. 1956), 35 TEX. L. REV. 263, 263 (1957).
238 Hal R. Morris, Contract Reformation-The Remedy When the Writing Is
Wrong, 93 ILL. B.J. 584, 585 (2005).
"' Gouge v. McNamara, 586 N.W.2d 710, 713 (Iowa Ct. App. 1998).
240 Van Bibber Homes Sales v. Marlow, 778 N.E.2d 852, 857 (Ind. Ct. App.
2002).
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III. EQUITABLY REMEDYING THE BREACH
Some jurisdictions have concluded that surrogacy contracts
are against public policy. 2 41 A majority of the states have not
enacted statutes indicating their stance on surrogacy
agreements.24 2 Nonetheless, persons in those jurisdictions have
continued to enter into surrogacy agreements. Some states limit
the application of their surrogacy statutes to married couples.
This disadvantages single persons and persons in same-sex
relationships. In those areas, courts do not have to enforce those
agreements. A woman who enters into a surrogate arrangement
should not be permitted to keep the child just because the court
is unwilling to recognize the surrogacy contract. Courts should
rely upon the remedies of promissory estoppel and unjust
enrichment to rule that the surrogate is not the child's legal
mother.
A. Promissory Estoppel
Traditionally, promissory estoppel has been recognized as
strictly a defensive theory; however, recently, courts have
permitted parties to use it as an independent cause of action.2 43
Promissory estoppel applies in a situation where there is not a
valid contract. If the evidence indicates that a valid contract
does exist, the parties cannot bring a cause of action for
promissory estoppel.244 Promissory estoppel is an equitable
remedy awarded by the court to permit the enforcement of a
promise that would not otherwise be enforceable.24 5  Persons
claiming promissory estoppel must prove the following elements:
(1) a clear and unambiguous promise exists; (2) the party to
whom the promise was made has relied upon that promise;
(3) the reliance was reasonable and foreseeable; and (4) the party
241 Christine A. Bjorkman, Note, Sitting in Limbo: The Absence of Connecticut
Regulation of Surrogate Parenting Agreements and Its Effect on Parties to the
Agreement, 21 QUINNIPIAC PROB. L.J. 141, 147 (2008).
242 Christen Blackburn, Note, Family Law-Who Is a Mother? Determining
Legal Maternity in Surrogacy Arrangements in Tennessee, 39 U. MEM. L. REV. 349,
370 (2009).
24 Michael B. Metzger & Michael J. Phillips, Promissory Estoppel and Third
Parties, 42 Sw. L.J. 931, 937 (1988); see also Foote v. Simmonds Precision Prods. Co.,
613 A.2d 1277, 1280 (Vt. 1992).
244 Doctors Hosp. 1997, L.P. v. Sambuca Houston, L.P., 154 S.W.3d 634, 636
(Tex. Ct. App. 2004).
245 Skebba v. Kasch, 724 N.W.2d 408, 411 (Wis. Ct. App. 2006).
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claiming the estoppel was injured because of his or her
reliance.24 6 Courts have broad discretion when deciding whether
to apply promissory estoppel.24 7
In jurisdictions that bar surrogate contracts, the contracts
essentially do not exist. Thus, promissory estoppel may be
applied to the situation. Promissory estoppel should be applied
in order to be fair to the intended parents. In the cases involving
disputes between the surrogate and the intended parents, the
parties usually admit that the surrogate promised to surrender
the child to the contracting couple. Once that promise is
established, the rest of the elements of promissory estoppel are
relatively easy to prove. When a woman agrees to serve as a
surrogate for the intended parents, they rely on that promise in
numerous ways. They may announce to their friends that they
are expecting a baby. Per the surrogacy agreement, the intended
parents pay the medical expenses for the surrogate. They
usually take the surrogate to her doctor's appointments and
participate actively in the pregnancy. In addition, the couple will
probably expend money setting up a nursery and buying clothes
for the baby. In some instances, the couple attends a baby
shower.
The reliance by the contracting couple is reasonable because
persons have to prepare in advance for the birth of a child. A
special relationship usually develops between the intended
parents and the surrogate. As a result of that relationship, the
intended parents feel that they can trust the surrogate to honor
her word. The surrogacy system is built on that trust. If people
thought that surrogates would not keep their promises, they
would be discouraged from using surrogates. The courts need to
step in and ensure couples that they can rely upon the integrity
of the system. The intended parents make financial and
emotional investments in reliance on the surrogate's promise to
give them the child. The surrogate should foresee that the
intended parents would rely upon her promise to turn over the
child to them because most intended parents are desperate for a
child and that desperation is usually apparent. The intended
parents are injured by the surrogate's refusal to surrender the
child. The injury is financial and emotional. Couples who use
246 Baker v. Ayres & Baker Pole & Post, Inc., 170 P.3d 1247, 1250 (Wyo. 2007).
247 U.S. Ecology, Inc. v. State, 28 Cal. Rptr. 3d 894, 905 (Ct. App. 2005).
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surrogates have often dealt with the pain of not being able to
conceive. Once they get their hopes up, it is devastating to lose
the child.
A lot has been written about the negative impacts that
surrogacy arrangements have on surrogateS248 and the resulting
children. 249  Nonetheless, most commentators have ignored the
emotional and financial toll the process can take on the
contracting couple. Persons usually do not enter into surrogacy
arrangements lightly. For those couples, surrogacy is often a last
resort.2 50 The average intended parents typically have suffered
the pain of infertility. They have attempted unsuccessfully to
have a child naturally or by adoption. At the point they contact a
surrogate, they are often desperate for a child.25' They have been
unfairly portrayed as wealthy couples waiting to exploit lower-
income women. That image does not fit the typical intended
parents. If the court does not require the surrogate to honor the
agreement, she may also be unjustly enriched.
B. Unjust Enrichment
"To find unjust enrichment, a party must have received
something of value to which he [or she] was not entitled and
which he [or she] should restore."2 52 Unjust enrichment is an
appropriate remedy in cases where justice dictates that a person
be compensated for property or services he or she provides under
the terms of a contract, and the person does not have a cause of
action based on the contract.2 53 The doctrine of unjust
enrichment is based on the belief that a party should not be
allowed to be unjustly enriched at the expense of another or
248 See, e.g., Lori B. Andrews, Commentary, Beyond Doctrinal Boundaries: A
Legal Framework for Surrogate Motherhood, 81 VA. L. REV. 2343, 2350-51 (1995);
see also Jennifer L. Watson, Note, Growing a Baby for Sale or Merely Renting a
Womb: Should Surrogate Mothers Be Compensated for Their Services?, 6 WHITTIER
J. CHILD. & FAM. ADVoC. 529, 544 (2007).
249 Jay R. Combs, Comment, Stopping the Baby-Trade: Affirming the Value of
Human Life Through the Invalidation of Surrogacy Contracts: A Blueprint for New
Mexico, 29 N.M. L. REV. 407, 408-09 (1999).
250 Richard A. Epstein, Surrogacy: The Case for Full Contractual Enforcement,
81 VA. L. REV. 2305, 2319-20 (1995).
251 See John M. Suender, Comment, Surrogate Motherhood Agreements and the
Law in Pennsylvania, 91 DICK. L. REV. 1085, 1092 (1987).
252 Sparks Reg'1 Med. Ctr. v. Blatt, 935 S.W.2d 304, 307 (Ark. Ct. App. 1996).
2-2 Rent-A-PC, Inc. v. Rental Mgmt., Inc., 901 A.2d 720, 723 (Conn. App. Ct.
2006).
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receive property or benefits without paying just compensation. 54
Consequently, the breaching party should be required to either
return the benefits he or she received or to compensate the non-
breaching party.2 55 When the court decides not to enforce a
surrogacy contract, the intended parents should be permitted to
avail themselves of the remedy of unjust enrichment.
Application of the doctrine should result in the intended mother
being adjudicated the legal mother of the child.
The elements of recovery based on unjust enrichment are as
follows: (1) defendant was enriched by the receipt of a benefit;
(2) the enrichment was at the expense of the plaintiff; and (3) it
is unjust to allow the defendant to retain the benefit under the
circumstances.5 To find unjust enrichment, a party must have
received something of value that he or she is not entitled to keep
and that he or she should restore. There must be some operative
act, intent, or situation to make enrichment unjust and
compensable.25 7 It is not necessary that the party who is unjustly
enriched be guilty of some wrongdoing. The focus is on whether
that person has something of value that he or she is not entitled
to keep. Permitting the person to keep the thing would lead to
the detriment of someone else.25 8 The enrichment must be
unjust.259
All of the elements of unjust enrichment are satisfied when
the surrogate is recognized as the legal mother of the child.
First, the surrogate is enriched because she receives the right to
keep the child. 26 0 The child is clearly a benefit to the woman.
Second, the contracting woman suffers the loss of the child
because the mother-child relationship is created between the
surrogate and the child. Since a child is not permitted to have
two legal mothers, the intended mother is deprived of the
24 State ex rel. Palmer v. Unisys Corp., 637 N.W.2d 142, 154 (Iowa 2001).
255 Morris v. Britt, 620 S.E.2d 422, 424 (Ga. Ct. App. 2005).
256 S & J, Inc. v. McLoud & Co., 108 S.W.3d 765, 768 (Mo. Ct. App. 2003).
257 Smith v. Whitener, 856 S.W.2d 328, 329-30 (Ark. Ct. App. 1993) (en banc).
25 See Petrie v. LeVan, 799 S.W.2d 632, 636 (Mo. Ct. App. 1990) (holding that
the defendant could not keep a windfall profit while the plaintiff suffered a
detriment from the transaction); Jennifer M. Nadler, What Right Does Unjust
Enrichment Law Protect?, 28 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 245, 270 (2008) ("[A]
successful claim in unjust enrichment depends on no wrongdoing, or even any
action, on the part of the defendant.").
259 Stoeckinger v. Presidential Fin. Corp. of Del. Valley, 948 A.2d 828, 833 (Pa.
Super. Ct. 2008).
260 Suender, supra note 251, at 1107.
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opportunity to parent the child she helped to conceive.26 The
damage is especially great in a gestational surrogacy situation
because the woman loses custody of her biological child. From a
public policy perspective, society does not want to take a child
from a biological parent who has not been shown to be unfit.2 62
The joy the surrogate feels from having a child is at the expense
of the intended mother who made plans to make the child a part
of her family. In light of the circumstances, it would be unfair to
permit the surrogate to keep the child.
In the case of a gestational surrogate, if she is permitted to
retain custody of a child who is not biologically related to her, she
has definitely been unjustly enriched. One of the purposes of
unjust enrichment is to discourage persons from making
misrepresentations to receive more than the benefit of their
bargains. 26 3 A gestational surrogate may enter the agreement
just to obtain the genetic materials she needs to have a child. If
the courts permit her to keep the child, she will be unjustly
enriched. The fact that she may be willing to return the money
paid by the intended parents is not relevant. Money will not
make the couple whole. The end result will be that the surrogate
is permitted to purchase embryos belonging to other people.
Gestation should not be enough to give the surrogate someone
else's biological child. With regards to a traditional surrogate,
even though she is contributing the eggs used to create the child,
she is also being unjustly enriched if she is allowed to keep the
child because the sperm belonged to a man that had no
connection to or relationship with her.
The deviation from a mutual purpose often leads to unjust
enrichment of one of the parties.2 " The appropriate remedy in a
case involving unjust enrichment is for the court to attempt to
place the party that has been harmed back in the position he or
261 Carlos R. Moreno, The Promise of Equality: The Evolution of the Family in
California, 44 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1, 3-4 (2010).
262 See Matthew R. Asman, Note, The Rights of a Foster Parent Versus the
Biological Parent Who Abandoned the Child: Where Do the Best Interests of the Child
Lie?, 8 CONN. PROB. L.J. 93, 97 (1993) (showing that courts prefer the biological
parent over the foster parent, as long as the biological parent is not unfit).
263 Cf Michele C. Meske, Note, Between the Devil and the Deep Blue Sea: Crime
Victims' Dilemma After Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of the New York Crime
Victims Board, 112 S. Ct. 501 (1991), 67 WASH. L. REV. 1001, 1006 (1992) ("[Pleople
should not profit from their wrongs through unjust enrichment.... [Plersons who
gain through conscious wrongdoing must disgorge their tainted earnings.").
264 Lewis v. Lewis, 189 P.3d 1134, 1144 (Colo. 2008) (en banc).
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she was in prior to the transaction that caused the unjust
enrichment.2 65  The court can accomplish that goal by either
returning something to the person or awarding damages.26 6
In the case of a surrogacy arrangement, the only way to
make the intended mother whole is to adjudicate her as the legal
mother of the child. If the case involves a gestational surrogate,
the court will be returning something to the woman-her
embryo. It does not matter that the embryo has been converted
into a baby. Damages can never replace what the woman has
lost. Before the surrogacy arrangement, the woman was
childless with an embryo that needed gestating. To restore the
woman to that position, the court must award her custody of the
child. In situations involving a traditional surrogate, the
intended mother has been deprived of sperm that she acquired
from her husband, significant other, or sperm donor. Since the
child is the end product of that sperm, the court should give her
the child.
The parties' mutual purpose in conceiving the child is
usually for the infertile couple to enjoy the benefits of
parenthood. The intended parents, in expending their resources
and, in some cases, contributing their genetic material,
demonstrate this mutual intent. Before the conception or the
birth of the child, the surrogate typically does not do anything to
indicate that she intends to parent the child. All of the
participants intended for the intended parents to obtain full and
complete custody of the resulting child. The intended parents
rely on the agreement and prepare to welcome the baby into their
home.
By initially signing the agreement or making the promise
and encouraging the intended parents to prepare to become
parents, the surrogate acts as if she intends the intended parents
to be recognized as the child's legal parents. The actions of the
intended parents indicate that they intend to be the legal
parents, and the surrogate does nothing to discourage their
expectations. For instance, the surrogate permits the couple to
invest financially and emotionally in the child. Moreover, the
intended parents pay the surrogate's medical and other expenses.
The surrogate does not do anything to indicate that she plans to
265 Id. at 1141.
266 Id.
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parent the child. Based upon the actions of the parties, the court
should not unjustly enrich the surrogate by adjudicating her to
be the child's legal mother.
IV. REBUTTABLE PRESUMPTION OF SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE
As indicated in the previous section, a person who breaches a
contract involving a unique good should expect to have to
specifically perform the contract. A person who contracts to buy
a particular house can only be made whole if he or she receives
that house. Monetary damages are not an adequate remedy for
the person because no two houses are exactly alike. Thus, the
person could not use the money he or she receives as damages to
purchase a house that is identical to the one for which he or she
bargained. This same logic follows when the case involves the
breach of a surrogacy contract. An infertile person who contracts
to receive a child will never be satisfied with money. In most
situations where the contracted-for item is unique, there is a
presumption of specific performance. Courts that follow that
point of view appear to treat this presumption as though it is
irrebutable.267
Children are living beings. Thus, they should not be treated
exactly like pieces of real property. To avoid that approach,
when courts are faced with the task of remedying a breach of a
surrogacy contract, they should presume that specific
performance is an appropriate remedy, but allow that
presumption to be rebutted. There should be a presumption of
specific performance because that approach is fair to all of the
parties involved in the case. The infertile person entered into the
surrogacy contract because she was desperate to become a
mother. No amount of money will remedy the harm the woman
suffers when the surrogate refuses to fulfill her end of the
bargain. Specific performance is fair to the surrogate because
surrendering the child would put her back in the place she was in
had she not entered into the contract. The presumption should
be rebuttable because, unlike a piece of real estate, children may
be hurt by the court's strict enforcement of the contract. The
267 See, e.g., New Life Cmty. Church of God v. Adomatis, 672 N.E.2d 433, 438
(Ind. Ct. App. 1996) (indicating that Indiana courts routinely award specific
performance of real estate contracts).
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surrogate can rebut the presumption by showing changed
circumstances that make surrendering the child to the intended
parents no longer feasible.
A. Changed Circumstances
When circumstances change, courts should have the
flexibility to modify decisions based upon the new circumstances.
Giving courts that option acknowledges that unanticipated
consequences and events can render court decisions obsolete or
unfair. To protect children, courts must be allowed to reevaluate
situations and to modify decisions in response to changed
circumstances. Courts apply the doctrine of changed
circumstances in several different areas of law. In property, a
person can avoid the enforcement of a restrictive covenant by
proving a change in circumstances.268 Moreover, a person
seeking a custody modification can argue that the original
custody arrangement should be modified due to a change in
circumstances.26 9 In international law, a country can suspend
the operation of a treaty based upon changed circumstances.2 7 0
Even in the law of trust, the court is permitted to modify a
private2 7 1 or charitable2 7 2 trust if changed circumstances make
the settlor's original purpose obsolete.
268 See Country Club Dist. Homes Ass'n v. Country Club Christian Church, 118
S.W.3d 185, 194 (Mo. Ct. App. 2003). A plaintiff seeking to void a restrictive
covenant based on changed circumstances must prove "(1) [tlhe radical change in
condition; (2) that as a result enforcement of the restrictions will work undue
hardship on him; (3) and will be of no substantial benefit to the plaintiff." Id.
269 See Boyer v. Heimermann, 238 S.W.3d 249, 255 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2007) ("The
threshold issue in every case involving a modification in an existing custody or
visitation arrangement is whether a material change in circumstances has
occurred.").
270 See Paul R. Williams, International Environmental Dispute Resolution: The
Dispute Between Slovakia and Hungary Concerning Construction of the Gabdikovo
and Nagymaros Dams, 19 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 1, 27 (1994).
271 See Daloia v. Franciscan Health Sys. of Cent. Ohio, Inc., 679 N.E.2d 1084,
1091-92 (Ohio 1997) ("Under the doctrine of deviation, a court can 'direct or permit a
deviation from the terms of the trust where compliance is impossible or illegal, or
where owing to circumstances not known to the settlor and not anticipated by him
compliance would defeat or substantially impair the accomplishment of the purposes
of the trust.'" (quoting AUSTIN WAKEMAN ScoTT & WILLIAM FRANKLIN FRATCHER,
THE LAW OF TRUSTS § 381 (4th ed. 1989))).
272 In re Estate of Othmer, 12 Misc. 3d 919, 922, 815 N.Y.S.2d 444, 446 (Sup. Ct.
Kings Cnty. 2006). Courts can use the cy pres doctrine to modify the terms of a
charitable trust if the person seeking the change shows that (1) the gift is charitable
in nature; (2) the donor has a general charitable intent; and (3) the changed
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B. Impracticability and Frustration of Purpose
In contract law, courts have considered at least two types of
changed circumstances to be adequate justification for a breach
of contract. The first type involves an unforeseeable
circumstance that renders performance of the contract vitally
different from what the parties reasonably anticipated
performance to require at the time of contracting. This type of
unanticipated change makes performance of the contract
impossible or impracticable. The second type involves
reductions in the value a party attaches to the performance to be
received from the other party. That type of unforeseen change
leads to what is recognized as frustration of purpose.27 4 Once the
purpose of the contract has been frustrated, it does not make
sense to force the parties to perform the obligations stated in the
contract.
In a surrogacy contract dispute, the only changed
circumstances that are relevant are those that impact the
surrogate's ability to give informed consent and the child's
opportunity to be placed in the best living environment. The
changed conditions may be events that occur after the child is
born. Moreover, information that was not made available to the
woman at the time she agreed to serve as a surrogate may also
be the basis for a changed circumstances argument. For
example, the intended parents may have a malevolent motive for
circumstances make it impossible to comply with the terms of the trust. See id. at
922, 815 N.Y.S.2d at 447.
273 Hendrick v. Green, 618 So. 2d 76, 79 (Miss. 1993). With regards to
impracticability, the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS states:
Where, after a contract is made, a party's performance is made
impracticable without his fault by the occurrence of an event the non-
occurrence of which was a basic assumption on which the contract was
made, his duty to render that performance is discharged, unless the
language or the circumstances indicate the contrary.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 261 (1981).
274 See City of Flint v. Chrisdom Props., Ltd, 770 N.W.2d 888, 891 (Mich. Ct.
App. 2009) (stating that a frustration of purpose occurs when changed circumstances
make one party's performance worthless). The RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
CONTRACTS addresses frustration of purpose by stating:
Where, after a contract is made, a party's principal purpose is substantially
frustrated without his fault by the occurrence of an event the non-
occurrence of which was a basic assumption on which the contract was
made, his remaining duties to render performance are discharged, unless
the language or the circumstances indicate the contrary.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 265.
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conceiving the child. In essence, the surrogate has to convince
the court that she discovered information or things happened
that make her feel that placement of the child with the intended
parents would be detrimental. The surrogate can make her
rebuttal argument based upon the contract theories of
impracticability and frustration of purpose.
The pertinent changed circumstances may include one or
more of the following: (1) the intended parents have separated or
divorced; (2) the intended parents are no longer in a situation to
financially provide for the child; (3) the health of the intended
parents has declined; or (4) the relationship between the
surrogate and the intended parents has deteriorated. The
surrogate may also have information indicating that placement
with the intended parents would not be in the child's best
interests. For example, the couple may have shown very little
interest in the child even though the surrogate did nothing to
negatively impact the relationship. Either one of those factors
may impact the surrogate's decision to retain custody of the child.
The woman's decision to act as a surrogate for the intended
parents may have been based upon her desire to help a loving
couple have a child. If the intended parents have separated or
divorced, the woman may be reluctant to see the child placed in a
broken home. Moreover, the surrogate may fear that the child
will end up in the middle of a custody dispute. Since the
surrogate cannot repair the relationship between the intended
parents, she may conclude that it is impossible to place the child
in the two-parent home that she envisioned when she initially
agreed to serve as a surrogate. Thus, she may try to convince the
court that the change in circumstances should rebut the
presumption that she is obligated to surrender the child to the
intended parents.
The surrogate may also argue that her purpose for acting as
a surrogate has been frustrated. The surrogate's goal was to
surrender the child to an intact family. If the intended parents
do not reunite, the surrogate's purpose will be defeated. The
nature of the relationship between the surrogate and the
intended parents may also influence the surrogate's decision to
keep custody of the child. When she agreed to assist the
intended parents in their quest to have a child, the parties may
have agreed that the surrogate could remain a part of the child's
life. This may especially be true in a situation involving a
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traditional surrogate. There have been cases where the intended
parents send the surrogate pictures and progress reports on the
child. The fact that she had a good relationship with the
intended parents may be the only reason why the surrogate
agreed to help the couple become parents. After that relationship
sours, the surrogate may feel that it is impracticable for her to
turn the child over to the intended parents. The surrogate
should be able to present evidence of changed circumstances to
rebut the presumption of specific performance and permit the
court to determine maternity based upon the best interests of the
child.
CONCLUSION
Collaborative reproduction is now possible and beneficial.
Relying on the use of assisted reproductive technology, like
artificial insemination, infertile couples can become parents.
Those couples can seek help from women who are willing to act
as surrogates. The intended couple and the surrogate collaborate
to ensure that a child is conceived, gestated, and born. That
process enables persons who want to become parents to have the
opportunity to have children conceived using their genetic
material. The surrogate usually wants to make sure that the
child is placed in a good home. She is often mainly motivated by
the desire to help an infertile couple become parents. The money
that she receives for her medical and other expenses is not the
reason that she agrees to serve as a surrogate.
Surrogacy arrangements usually go smoothly and all of the
parties are satisfied with the outcome. The intended parents
receive the child, and the surrogate gets the things she is
promised under the surrogacy contract. However, sometimes the
surrogate refuses to surrender the child to the intended parents.
In response, the intended parents seek assistance from the
judicial system. When the case is filed, the court has to decide
whether to treat the case as a custody dispute or a breach of
contract case. If the court views it as a custody case, it will apply
different tests to adjudicate the maternity of the child. On the
other hand, if the court views it as a breach of contract case, the
court must decide the appropriate remedy to award the intended
parents. Given the existence of an oral or written contract, the
court should apply contract principles and not family law
principles to resolve surrogacy custody disputes. Since children
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are unique, courts should presume that the contract should be
specifically enforced. As a result, the intended mother should be
adjudicated as the legal mother. In the interest of fairness, the
court should give the surrogate the opportunity to rebut the
presumption of specific performance by showing changed
circumstances.
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